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Abstract
This work presents a precise connection between Clifford circuits, Shor’s factor-
ing algorithm and several other famous quantum algorithms with exponential quantum
speed-ups for solving Abelian hidden subgroup problems. We show that all these dif-
ferent forms of quantum computation belong to a common new restricted model of
quantum operations that we call black-box normalizer circuits. To define these, we ex-
tend the previous model of normalizer circuits [1–3], which are built of quantum Fourier
transforms, group automorphism and quadratic phase gates associated with an Abelian
group G. In [1–3], the group is always given in an explicitly decomposed form. In our
model, we remove this assumption and allow G to be a black-box group [4]. While
standard normalizer circuits were shown to be efficiently classically simulable [1–3], we
find that normalizer circuits are powerful enough to factorize and solve classically-hard
problems in the black-box setting. We further set upper limits to their computational
power by showing that decomposing finite Abelian groups is complete for the associ-
ated complexity class. In particular, solving this problem renders black-box normalizer
circuits efficiently classically simulable by exploiting the generalized stabilizer formal-
ism in [1–3]. Lastly, we employ our connection to draw a few practical implications
for quantum algorithm design: namely, we give a no-go theorem for finding new quan-
tum algorithms with black-box normalizer circuits, a universality result for low-depth
normalizer circuits, and identify two other complete problems.
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1 Introduction
What are the potential uses and limitations of quantum computers? Arguably, the most
attractive feature of quantum computers is their ability to efficiently solve problems for
which no efficient classical solution is known. To date, a successful number of quantum
algorithms have been discovered [5–10]. Yet it remains one of the greatest challenges of the
field of quantum computing to understand for which precise problems quantum algorithms
can be exponentially (or super-polynomially) faster than their classical counterparts. Some
reasons why this question seems to be hard to answer have been discussed by Shor [11].
A fruitful approach to understand the emergence and the structure of exponential quan-
tum speed-ups is to study restricted models of quantum computation. Ideally, the latter
should exhibit interesting quantum features and, at the same time, have less power than
universal quantum computers (up to reasonable computational complexity assumptions).
To date, several models studied in the literature seem to have these desirable properties, in-
cluding Clifford circuits [12–15], nearest-neighbor matchgates [16–19], Gaussian operations
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[20–22], the one-clean qubit (DQC1) model [23], and commuting circuits [24–27] (a more
complete list is given at the end of this section).
In this work, we introduce black-box normalizer circuits, a new restricted family of
quantum operations, and characterize their computational power. Our circuit model extends
the so-called model of normalizer circuits over Abelian groups [1–3], which, in turn,
generalizes the better-known model of Clifford circuits [12–15]. In [1–3], normalizer circuits
act in high and infinite dimensional systems associated with an Abelian group G. The
Hilbert space H has a standard basis {|g〉}g∈G labeled by the elements of G. The allowed
operations, called normalizer gates, can be of three types.
1. Quantum Fourier transforms over subgroups of G.
2. Group automorphism gates: permutation-like gates that implement automorphisms of
the group G.
3. Quadratic phase gates: diagonal gates which multiply standard basis states by quadratic
phases.
In all previous work [1–3], the group G is assumed to be given in a factorized form (1), which
endows the Hilbert space of the computation with a tensor-product structure:
G = Za × Tb × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ←→ H = H⊗(a+b)Z ⊗HN1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HNc . (1)
In (1) Z is the group of integers, ZN the group of integers modulo N , and T is the circle
group, consisting of angles from 0 to 1 (in units of 2pi) with the addition modulo 1. The
Hilbert space HZ has a standard basis labeled by integers (Z basis) and a Fourier-basis
labeled by angles (T basis).
A normalizer circuit over G [1–3] is any quantum circuit composed of normalizer gates.
In particular, n-qubit Clifford circuits are normalizer circuits over the group Zn2 .
Despite containing arbitrary numbers of quantum Fourier transforms (which play an
important role in Shor’s algorithms [28]) and entangling gates (automorphism, quadratic
phase gates), it was shown in [1–3] that normalizer circuits can be efficiently simulated
by classical computers. This result exploits an extended stabilizer formalism to track
the evolution of normalizer circuits and generalizes the celebrated Gottesman-Knill theorem
[12, 13].
The key new element in our work are normalizer circuits that can be associated with
Abelian black-box groups [4], which we may simply call “black-box normalizer circuits”.
An group B (always Abelian in this work) is a black-box group if it is finite, its elements
are uniquely encoded by strings of some length n and the group operation is performed by
a black-box (the group oracle) in one time-step. We define black-box normalizer circuits to
be a normalizer circuits associated with groups of the form G = Gprev ×B, where Gprev is
of form (1).
The key new feature in our work is that the black-box group B is not given to us in
a factorized form. This is a subtle yet tremendously important difference: although such a
decomposition always exists for any finite Abelian group [29], finding just one is regarded
as a hard computational problem; indeed, it is provably at least as hard as factoring1. Our
motivation to adopt the notion of black-box group is to study Abelian groups for which
1Knowing B ∼= Zd1 × · · · × Zdm implies that the order of the group |G| = d1d2 · · · dm. Hardness results
for computing orders [4, 30] imply that the problem is provably hard for classical computers in the black-box
setting. For groups Z×N , computing ϕ(N) := |Z
×
N | (the Euler totient function) is equivalent to factoring [31].
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the group multiplication can be performed in classical polynomial-time while no efficient
classical algorithm to decompose them is known. A key example is Z×N , the multiplicative
group of integers modulo1, which plays an important role in Shor’s factoring algorithm [28].
With some abuse of notation, we call any such group also a “black-box group”2.
Statement of results
This work focuses on understanding the potential uses and limitations of black-box normal-
izer circuits. Our results (listed below) give a precise characterization of their computa-
tional power. On one hand, we show that several famous quantum algorithms, including
shor’s celebrated factoring algorithm, can be implemented with black-box normalizer cir-
cuits. On the other hand, we apply our former simulation results [1–3] to set upper limits to
the class of problems that these circuits can solve, as well as to draw practical implications
for quantum algorithm design.
Our main results are now summarized:
1. Quantum algorithms. We show that many of the best known quantum algorithms
are particular instances of normalizer circuits over black-box groups, including Shor’s
celebrated factoring and discrete-log algorithms; it follows that black-box normalizer
circuits can achieve exponential quantum speed-ups. Namely, the following algo-
rithms are examples of black-box normalizer circuits.
• Discrete logarithm. Shor’s discrete-log quantum algorithm [28] is a normalizer
circuit over Z2p−1 × Z×p (theorem 1 5.1).
• Factoring. We show that a hybrid infinite-finite dimensional version of Shor’s
factoring algorithm [28] can be implemented with normalizer circuit over Z×Z×N .
We prove that there is a close relationship between Shor’s original algorithm and
our version: Shor’s can be understood as a discretized qubit implementation of
ours (theorems 2, 3). We also discuss that the infinite group Z plays a key role
in our “infinite Shor’s algorithm”, by showing that it is impossible to implement
Shor’s modular-exponentiation gate efficiently, even approximately, with finite-
dimensional normalizer circuits (theorem 4). Last, we further conjecture that
only normalizer circuits over infinite groups can factorize (conjecture 1).
• Elliptic curves. The generalized Shor’s algorithm for computing discrete loga-
rithms over an elliptic curve [32–34] can be implemented with black-box normal-
izer circuits (section 5.3); in this case, the black-box group is the group of integral
points E of the elliptic curve instead of Z×p .
• Group decomposition. Cheung-Mosca’s algorithm for decomposing black-box
finite Abelian groups [35, 36] is a combination of several types of black-box nor-
malizer circuits. In fact, we discuss a new extended Cheung-Mosca’s algorithm
that finds even more information about the structure of the group and it is also
based on normalizer circuits (section 5.5).
2It will always be clear from context whether the group multiplication is performed by an oracle at unit
cost or by some well-known polynomial-time classical algorithm. Most results will be stated in the black-box
setting though.
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• Hidden subgroup problem. Deutsch’s [37], Simon’s [38] and, in fact, all quan-
tum algorithms that solve Abelian hidden subgroup problems [39–46], are nor-
malizer circuits over groups of the form G×O, where G is the group that contains
the hidden subgroup H and O is a group isomorphic to G/H (section 5.4). The
group O, however, is not a black-box group due to a small technical difference
between our oracle model we use and the oracle setting in the HSP.
• Hidden kernel problem. The group O ∼= G/H in the previous section becomes
a black-box group if the oracle function in the HSP is a homomorphism between
black-box groups: we call this subcase the hidden kernel problem (HKP). The
difference does not seem to be very significant, and can be eliminated by choosing
different oracle models (section 5.4). However, we will never refer to Simon’s or
to general Abelian HSP algorithms as “black-box normalizer circuits”, in order to
be consistent with our and pre-existing terminology.
Note that it follows from the above that black-box normalizer circuits can render
insecure widespread public-key cryptosystems, namely, Diffie-Hellman key-exchange
[47], RSA [48] and elliptic curve cryptography [49, 50].
2. Group decomposition is as hard as simulating normalizer circuits. Another
main contribution of this work is to show that the group decomposition problem (suit-
ably formalized) is, in fact, complete for the complexity class Black-Box Normal-
izer, of problems efficiently solvable by probabilistic classical computers with oracular
access to black-box normalizer circuits. Since normalizer circuits over decomposed
groups are efficiently classically simulable [1–3], this result suggests that the compu-
tational power of normalizer circuits originate precisely in the classical hardness of
learning the structure of a black-box group.
We obtain this last result by proving a significantly stronger theorem (theorem 6),
which states that any black-box normalizer circuit can be efficiently simulated step by
step by a classical computer if an efficient subroutine for decomposing finite Abelian
groups is provided.
3. A no-go theorem for new quantum algorithms. In this work, we provide an
negative answer to the question “can new quantum algorithms based on normalizer
circuits be found? ”: by applying the latter simulation result, we conclude that any new
algorithm not in our list can be efficiently simulated step-by-step using the extended
Cheung-Mosca algorithm and classical post-processing. This implies (theorem 7) that
new exponential speed-ups cannot be found without changing our setting (we discuss
how the setting might be changed in the discussion 1). This result says nothing about
polynomial speed-ups.
4. Universality of short normalizer circuits. A practical consequence of our no-go
theorem is that all problems in the class Black Box Normalizer can be solved us-
ing short normalizer circuits with a constant number of normalizer gates. (We may
still need polynomially many runs of such circuits, along with classical processing in
between, but each individual normalizer circuit is short.) We find this observation
interesting, in that it explains a very curious feature present in all the quantum al-
gorithms that we study [28, 32–46] (section 5): they all contain at most a constant
number of quantum Fourier transforms (actually at most two).
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5. Other complete problems. As our last contribution in this series, we identify
another two complete problems for the class Black Box Normalizer (section 8):
these are the (afore-mentioned) Abelian hidden kernel problem, and the problem of
finding a general-solution to a system of linear equations over black-box groups (the
latter are related to the systems of linear equations over groups studied in [2, 3].
A link between Clifford circuits and Shor’s algorithm
The results in this work together with those previously obtained in [1–3] demonstrate the
existence of a precise connection between Clifford circuits and Shor’s factoring algorithm.
At first glance, it might be hard to digest that two types of quantum circuits that seem to
be so far away from each other might related at all. Indeed, classically simulating Shor’s
algorithm is widely believed to be an intractable problem (at least as hard as factoring),
while a zoo of classical techniques and efficient classical algorithms exist for simulating and
computing properties of Clifford circuits [12–15, 51–57]. However, from the point of view of
this paper, both turn out to be intimately related in that they both are just different types of
normalizer circuits. In other words, they are both members of a common family of quantum
operations.
Remarkably, this correspondence between Clifford and Shor, rather than being just a
mere mathematical curiosity, has also some sensible consequences for the theory of quantum
computing. One that follows from theorem 6, our simulation result, is that all algorithms
studied in this work (Shor’s factoring and discrete-log algorithms, Cheung-Mosca’s, etc.)
have a rich hidden structure which enables simulating them classically with a stabilizer
picture approach “à la Gottesman-Knill” [12, 13]. This structure let us track the evolution
of the quantum state of the computation step by step with a very special algorithm, which,
despite being inefficient, exploits completely different algorithmic principles than the naive
brute-force approach: i.e., writing down the coefficients of the initial quantum state and
tracking their quantum mechanical evolution through the gates of the circuit3. Although
the stabilizer-picture simulation is inefficient when black-box groups are present (i.e., it does
not yield an efficient classical algorithm for simulating Shor’s algorithm), the mere existence
of such an algorithm reveals how much mathematical structure these quantum algorithms
have in common with Clifford and normalizer circuits.
In retrospect, and from an applied point of view, it is also rather satisfactory that one can
gracefully exploit the above connection to draw practical implications for quantum algorithm
design: in our work, we have actively used our knowledge of the hidden “Clifford-ish” math-
ematical features of the Abelian hidden subgroup problem algorithms in deriving results 2,
3, 4 and 5 (in the list given in the previous section).
3Note that throughout this manuscript we always work at a high-level of abstraction (algorithmically
speaking), and that the “steps” in a normalizer-based quantum algorithm are always counted at the logic
level of normalizer gates, disregarding smaller gates needed to implement them. In spite of this, we find
the above simulability property of black-box normalizer circuits to be truly fascinating. To get a better
grasp of its significance, we may perform the following thought experiment. Imagine, we would repeatedly
concatenate black-box normalizer circuits in some intentionally complex geometric arrangement, in order
to form a gargantuan, intricate “Shor’s algorithm” of monstrous size. Even in this case, our simulation
result states that if we can decompose Abelian groups (say, with an oracle), then we can efficiently simulate
the evolution of the circuit, normalizer-gate after normalizer-gate, independently of the number of Fourier
transforms, automorphism and quadratic-phase gates involved in the computation (the overhead of the
classical simulation is always at most polynomial in the input-size).
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As a side remark, we regard it a memorable curiosity that replacing decomposed groups
with black-box groups not only renders the simulation methods in [1–3] inefficient (this is, in
fact, something to be expected, due to the existence of hard computational problems related
to black-box groups), but it is also precisely this modification that suddenly bridges the gap
between Clifford/normalizer circuits, Shor’s algorithms, Simon’s and so on.
Finally, it is mathematically elegant to note that all normalizer circuits we have studied
are related through the so-called Pontryagin-Van Kampen duality [58–64], which states
that all locally-compact Abelian (LCA) groups are dual to their characters groups. The role
of this duality in the normalizer circuit model was discussed in our previous work [3].
Relationship to previous work
Up to our best knowledge, neither normalizer circuits over black-box groups, nor their rela-
tionship with Shor’s algorithm or the Abelian hidden subgroup problem, have been previously
investigated. Normalizer circuits over explicitly-decomposed finite groups ZN1 × · · · × ZNa
were studied in [1, 2], by two of us. We recently extended the formalism in [3] to infinite
groups of the form Za × Tb × ZN1 × · · · × ZNa.
Clifford circuits over qubits and qudits (which can be understood as normalizer circuits
over groups of the form Zm2 and Z
m
d ) have been extensively investigated in the literature
[12–15, 51–53, 56, 55, 57]. Certain generalizations of Clifford circuits that are not normalizer
circuits have also been studied: [52, 65, 19, 55, 57] consider Clifford circuits supplemented
with some non-Clifford ingredients; a different form of Clifford circuits based on projective
normalizers of unitary groups were investigated in [66].
The hidden subgroup problem (HSP) has played a central role in the history of quantum
algorithms and has been extensively studied before our work. The Abelian HSP, which is
also a central subject of this work, is related to most of the best known quantum algorithms
that were found in the early days of the field [37–46]. Its best-known generalization, the
non-Abelian HSP, has also been heavily investigated due to its relationship to the graph iso-
morphism problem and certain shortest-vector-lattice problems [67–85] (see also the reviews
[86, 87, 8] and references therein).
The notion of black-box group, which is a key concept in our setting, was first considered
by Babai and Szméredi in [4] and have since been extensively studied in classical complexity
theory [88–91, 30]. In general, black-box groups may not be Abelian and do not need to have
uniquely represented elements [4]; in the present work, we only consider Abelian uniquely-
encoded black-box groups.
In quantum computing, black-box groups were previously investigated in the context of
quantum algorithms, both in the Abelian [35, 36, 92] and the non-Abelian group setting
[93, 73, 81, 94, 95, 80, 96, 97]. Except for a few exceptions (cf. [93, 92]) most quantum
results have been obtained for uniquely-encoded black-box groups.
Aside from generalizations of Clifford circuits [1–3, 12–15, 51–57] (which includes nor-
malizer circuits), many other classes of restricted quantum circuits have been studied in
the literature. Some examples (by no means meant to be an exhaustive list) are nearest-
neighbor matchgate circuits [16–19, 98–102], the one-clean qubit model [103–110], circuit
models based on Gaussian or linear-optical operations [20–22, 111–114], commuting circuits
[24–27], low-entangling4 circuits [116, 117] , low-depth circuits [118, 119], tree-like circuits
4Here entanglement is measured with respect to the Schmidt-rank measure ( low-entangling circuits with
respect to continuous entanglement measures are universal for quantum computation [115]).
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[119–123], low-interference circuits [124, 125] and a few others [126, 127].
Discussion and outlook
We finish our introduction by discussing a few potential avenues for finding new quantum
algorithms as well as some open questions suggested by our work.
In this work, we provide a strict no-go theorem for finding new quantum algorithms with
black-box normalizer circuits, as we define them. There are, however, a few possible ways
to modify our setting leading to scenarios where one could bypass these results and, indeed,
find new interesting quantum algorithms. We now discuss some.
One enticing possibility would be to study possible extensions of the normalizer circuit
framework to non-Abelian groups, in connection with non-Abelian hidden subgroup problems
[67–85]. We have not addressed this question in the present work. In this direction, the
classical simulability of non-Abelian quantum Fourier transforms was studied in [128] by one
of us.
A second possibility would be to consider more general types of normalizer circuits than
ours, by extending the class of Abelian groups they can be associated with. However,
looking at more general decomposed groups does not look particularly promising: we believe
that the methods here and in [3] can be extended, e.g., to simulate normalizer circuits over
groups of the form Ra × Zb × Tc × ZN1 × · · · × ZNd ×B, with additional R factors (cf. our
discussion in [3]). On the other hand, allowing more general types of groups to act as black-
boxes looks rather promising to us: one may, for instance, attempt to extend the notion of
normalizer circuits to act on Hilbert spaces associated with multi-dimensional infrastructures
[129, 130], which may, informally, be understood as “infinite black-box groups”5 We expect,
in fact, that known quantum algorithms for finding hidden periods and hidden lattices within
real vector spaces [131–134] and/or or infrastructures [129, 130] (e.g., Hallgren’s algorithm
for solving Pell’s equation [131, 132]) could be at least partially interpreted as generalized
normalizer circuits in this sense . Addressing this question would require a careful treatment
of precision errors that appear in such algorithms due to the presence of transcendental
numbers, which play no role in the present paper6. Some open questions in this quantum
algorithm subfield have been discussed in [130].
A third possible direction to investigate would be whether different models of normalizer
circuits could be constructed over algebraic structures that are not groups. One could,
for instance, consider sets with less algebraic structure, like semi-groups. In this regard, we
highlight that a quantum algorithm for finding discrete logarithms over finite semigroups was
recently given in [135]. Alternatively, one could study also sets with more structure than
groups, such as fields, whose study is relevant to Van Dam-Seroussi’s quantum algorithm for
estimating Gauss sums [136].
Lastly, we mention some open questions suggested by our work.
5An n-dimensional infrastructure I provides a classical presentation for an n-dimensional hypertorus
group Rn/Λ ∼= Tn, where Λ is an (unknown) period lattice Λ. The elements of this continuous group are
represented with some classical structures known as f-representations, which are endowed with an operation
that allows us to compute within the torus. Although one must deal carefully with non-trivial technical
aspects of infinite groups in order to properly define and compute with f -representations (cf. [129, 130] and
references therein), one may intuitively understand infrastructures as “generalized black-box hypertoruses”.
We stress, though, that it is not standard terminology to call “black-box group” to an infinite group.
6No such treatment is needed in this work, since we study quantum algorithms for finding hidden structures
in discrete groups.
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In this work, we have not investigated the computational complexity of black-box normal-
izer circuits without classical post-processing. There are two facts which suggest that power
of black-box normalizer circuits alone might, in fact, be significantly smaller. The first is
the fact that the complexity class of problems solvable by Clifford circuits alone is ⊕L [52],
believed to be a strict subclass of P. The second is that normalizer circuits seem to be
incapable of implementing most classical functions coherently even with constant accuracy
(this has been rigorously shown in finite dimensions [1, 2]).
Finally, one may study whether considering more general types of inputs, measurements
or adaptive operations might change the power of black-box normalizer circuits. Allowing,
for instance, input product states has potential to increase the power of these circuits, since
this already occurs for standard Clifford circuits [65, 57]. Concerning measurements, the
authors believe that allowing, e.g. adaptive Pauli operator measurements (in the sense of
[2]) is unlikely to give any additional computational power to black-box normalizer circuits:
in the best scenario, this could only happen in infinite dimensions, since adaptive normalizer
circuits over finite Abelian groups are also efficiently classically simulable with stabilizer
techniques [2]. With more general types of measurements, it should be possible to recover
full quantum universality, given that qubit cluster-states (which can be generated by Clifford
circuits) are a universal resource for measurement-based quantum computation [137, 138].
The possibility of obtaining intermediate hardness results if non-adaptive yet also non-Pauli
measurements are allowed (in the lines of [111] or [57, theorem 7]) remains also open.
2 Abelian groups
The most general groups we will consider in this work are abelian groups of the form
G = Za × Tb × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ×B, (2)
where a, b, N1, · · · , Nc are arbitary integers and B is a finite abelian black box group, to be
defined more precisely later.
We will discuss each of the constitutent groups in turn.
2.1 Z: the group of integers
Z simply refers to the group of integers under addition; it is infinite, but finitely generated
(by the element 1).
2.2 T: the torus group
T refers to the group of real numbers in the interval [0, 1) under addition modulo 1. Unlike
all the other components we will consider, it is both infinite and not finitely generated. The
introduction of T is necessary to allow the use of quantum Fourier transforms over Z, as
we’ll see in the next section.
2.3 Finite Abelian groups
Let us start by stating a very important theorem we will use for our results:
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Theorem 1 (Fundamental Theorem of Finite Abelian Groups [29]). Any finite
Abelian group G has a decomposition into a direct product of cyclic groups, i.e.
G ∼= Zd1 × Zd2 × · · · × Zdk (3)
for some positive integers d1, · · · , dk.
Actually finding such a decomposition for a group G may be difficult in practice. For
example, consider the set of integers modulo N that are also relatively prime to N ; this
set forms a group under multiplication. (This group is known as the multiplicative group
of integers modulo N , or Z×N .) It is not known classically how to decompose Z
×
N into its
cyclic subgroups. For example, if N = pq for p, q prime then Z×pq ∼= Zp−1 ×Zq−1, and hence
decomposing Z×pq is at least as hard as factoring pq or, equivalently, breaking RSA [48]. More
generally, decomposing Z×N is known to be polynomial time equivalent to factoring [31]. In
the quantum case, however, Cheung and Mosca gave an algorithm [35, 36] to decompose any
finite abelian group.
In equation (2), the factors ZN1 × · · · × ZNc represent an arbitrary finite Abelian group
for which the group decomposition is known. The case where the decomposition is unknown
will be covered by the black box group B.
2.4 Black box groups
In this work, we define a black-box group B [4] to be a finite group whose elements are
uniquely encoded by binary strings of a certain size n, which is the length of the encoding.
The elements of the black-box group can be multiplied and inverted at unit cost by querying
a black-bock, or group oracle, which computes these operations for us. The order of a black-
box group with encoding length n is bounded above by 2n: the precise order |B| may not be
given to us, but it is assumed that the group oracle can identify which strings in the group
encoding correspond to elements of the group. When we say that a particular black-box
group (or subgroup) is given (as the input to some algorithm), it is meant that a list of
generators of the group or subgroup is explicitly provided.
From now on, all black-box groups in this work will be assumed to be Abelian. Although
we only consider finite Abelian black-box groups, we stress now, that there is a subtle but
crucial difference between these groups and the explicitly decomposed finite Abelian groups
in [1, 2]: although, mathematically, all Abelian black-box groups have a decomposition (3), it
is computationally hard to find one and we assume no knowledge of it. In fact, our motivation
to introduce black-box groups in our setting is precisely to model those Abelian groups that
cannot be efficiently decomposed with known classical algorithms that have, nevertheless,
efficiently classically computable group operations. With some abuse of notation, we shall
call all such groups also “black-box groups”, even if no oracle is needed to define them; in
such cases, oracle calls will be replaced by poly(n)-size classical circuits for computing group
multiplications and inversions.
As an example, let us consider again the group Z×N . This group can be naturally modeled
as a black-box group in the above sense: on one hand, for any x, y ∈ Z×N , xy and x−1 can be
efficiently computed using Euclid’s algorithm [139]; on the other hand, decomposing Z×N is
as hard as factoring [31]. Note, in addition, that a generating set of Z×N can found by taking
a linear number of samples7 of Z×N .
7Sampling Z×N can be done by sampling {0, · · · , N − 1} uniformly and then rejecting samples that are
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3 The Hilbert space of an Abelian group
In this section we introduce Hilbert spaces associated with Abelian groups of the form
G = Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNb ×B, (4)
where ZN is the additive group of integers modulo N , Z is the additive group of integers and
B is a black-box group. Apart from the short discussion on Hilbert space associated with
black-box groups, we follow the definitions given in our previous works [1–3].
3.1 Finite Abelian groups
First we consider ZN . With this group, we associate an N -dimensional Hilbert space HN
having a basis {|x〉 : x ∈ ZN}, henceforth called the standard basis of HN . A state in HN is
(as usual) a unit vector |ψ〉 =∑ψx|x〉 with∑ |ψx|2 = 1, where ψx ∈ C and where the sums
are over all x ∈ ZN .
Second, we consider a black box group B. With such a group we associate a |B|-
dimensional Hilbert space HB with standard basis states |b〉 where b ranges over all elements
of B.
3.2 The integers Z
An analogous construction is considered for the group Z, although an important distinction
with the former cases is that Z is infinite. We consider the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space
HZ = ℓ2(Z) with standard basis states |z〉 where |z〉 ∈ Z. A state in H has the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
ψx|x〉 (5)
with
∑ |ψx|2 = 1, where the infinite sum is over all x ∈ Z. More generally, any sequence (ψx :
x ∈ Z) with ∑ |ψx|2 <∞ can be associated with a quantum state in HZ via normalization.
Sequences whose sums are not finite give rise to “unnormalizable” states. These states do
not belong to HZ and are hence unphysical; however it is often convenient to consider such
states nonetheless. Examples are the “plane wave states”
|p〉 :=
∑
z∈Z
e2piizp|z〉 p ∈ [0, 1). (6)
We denote T := [0, 1) as a group with addition modulo 1, called the (one-dimentional) torus
group. Even though the |p〉 themselves do not belong to H, every state in the Hilbert space
HZ can be written as a linear combination of them:
|ψ〉 =
∫
T
dp φ(p)|p〉 (7)
for some complex function φ : T → C, where dp denotes the Haar measure on T. Thus the
states |p〉 form an alternate basis8 of H which is infinite, parametrized by a continuous set.
not relatively prime to N ; this takes O(log logN) trials to succeed with high probability. A similar approach
works, in general, for sampling generating-sets of uniquely-encoded finite Abelian groups [140].
8As discussed in [3], the states |p〉 are unnormalizable and, strictly speaking, do not form a “basis” in
the usual sense (they are not elements of HZ) but they can nevertheless used as a basis for our practical
purposes. Rigorously speaking, the |p〉 “states” can be understood as Dirac-delta measures or Schwartz-
Bruhat tempered distributions [141, 142]. Although we will not do it here, our results can be stated more
formally through the theory of rigged Hilbert spaces [143–146], which is often applied to study observables
with continuous spectra.
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We call this basis the Fourier basis. The Fourier basis is orthonormal in the sense that
〈p|p′〉 = δ(p − p′), (8)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta.
In the following, when dealing with the Hilbert space HZ, we will use both the standard
and Fourier basis. More precisely, in our computational model (cf. section 4), there are two
“standard” bases of the Hilbert space HZ, parametrized by the groups Z and T (we reserve
the term standard basis for the first, the Z basis). This is different from the finite space HN
where we only use the standard basis labeled by ZN .
3.3 Total Hilbert space
In general we will consider consider groups of the form (4). The associated Hilbert space
has the tensor product form
H = H⊗aZ ⊗HN1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HNc ⊗HB. (9)
In this work, we treat H as the underlying Hilbert space of a quantum computation with
m := a + c + 1 computational registers. The first a registers HZ are infinite dimensional.
The latter c + 1 registers are finite dimensional, and the last one, HB, is associated with
some Abelian black-box group B.
The group-element bases of H
As afore-mentioned, a normalizer computation works within multiple “standard bases” of H,
which can change during the computation. Input states and final measurements in any of
these bases are allowed. This is a central feature of the computational model we describe in
the next section.
The allowed bases of a normalizer computation are what-we-call the group-element bases
of H, which we now describe. A group element basis BG of H is a basis of group element
states {|g〉, g ∈ G} parametrized by an Abelian group G of the form
G = G1 × · · · ×Ga+b × ZN1 ⊗ . . .ZNc ×B where Gi ∈ {Z,T}, (10)
BG := {|g〉 := |g(1)〉 ⊗ . . . |g(m)〉, g = (g(1), . . . , g(m)) ∈ G} . (11)
The notation Gi = T indicated that the state |g(i)〉 (locally) is a Fourier state of Z (6). Note
that the states |g〉 are product-states with respect to the tensor-product structure (9) of H.
By construction, there are 2a possible choices of groups for the same Hilbert space, so that
the number of group-element bases is 2a. As discussed in [3] all groups (10) are related by
the Pontryagin duality9.
We now consider some examples. First, note that, by construction, the standard basis of
H is the group-element basis BG with G of the form Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ×B:
|x(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x(a)〉 ⊗ |y(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |y(c)〉 ⊗ |b〉, x(i) ∈ Z, y(j) ∈ ZNj , b ∈ B,
9Groups (10) form a family (and a category) of groups generated by replacing the factors Gi of the original
group Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc × B with their character groups, and then identifying isomorphic groups [3].
The so-called Pontryagin duality [58–62] determines the number 2a of groups in the family. The number
of group-element bases 2a is larger than 1 iff infinite groups are involved. Due to, there are not multiple
“standard-bases” in finite-dimensional normalizer circuits (nor in Clifford circuits) [1, 2].
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and, clearly, (x, y,b) is an element of Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNb ×B. Alternatively, by choosing
the basis of some (say the ath) HZ register to be the Fourier basis, we get
(|x(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x(a− 1)〉 ⊗ |p〉)⊗ |y(1)〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |y(c)〉 ⊗ |b〉,
where |p〉 is now a Fourier basis state (6). Now p ∈ T and the basis is parametrized by the
elements of (Za−1 × T)× ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ×B.
4 Black box normalizer circuits
In this section we define black-box normalizer circuits acting on Hilbert spaces of the form
(9). We will split the discussion in two parts: in section 4.1 we discuss black box nor-
malizer circuits for finite-dimensional spaces, i.e. spaces where HZ does not occur in the
decomposition. Restricting to the finite-dimensional case will allow us to introduce black
box normalizer circuits without many technical complications.
In a second step, in section 4.2 we allow for general spaces of the form (9). The definition
of black box normalizer circuits will be technically more involved owing to the fact that
in HZ both the standard basis and the Fourier basis need to be considered; this technical
element is however not essential to understand the basic idea behind black box normalizer
groups and the reader may skip section 4.2 in a first reading. However, the general definition
of black box normalizer circuits is necessary to make a rigorous connection with e.g. Shor’s
factoring algorithm.
4.1 Finite groups
Let G be a finite Abelian group of the form G = ZN1×· · ·×ZNc×B. The associated Hilbert
space
H = HN1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HNc ⊗HB (12)
has standard basis vectors |g〉 where g ranges over all elements of G (cf. section 3). A
normalizer gate over G is either an automorphism gate, quadratic phase gate or quantum
Fourier transform, as defined next:
Automorphism gates. Recall that a group automorphism is an invertible map α : G→ G
satisfying α(g + h) = α(g) + α(h) for every g, h ∈ G. An automorphism gate over G is
an operation Uα : |h〉 → |α(h)〉 where α is an automorphism; we consider automorphism
gates to be available as black-box quantum gates (oracles). Note that each Uα acts as a
permutation on the standard basis and is hence a unitary operation.
Quadratic phase gates. A function χ : G → U(1) (from the group G into the complex
numbers of unit modulus) is called a character if χ(g + h) = χ(g)χ(h) for every g, h ∈ G. A
function B : G×G→ U(1) is said to be a bicharacter if it is a character in both arguments.
A function ξ : G→ U(1) is called quadratic if
ξ(g + h) = ξ(g)ξ(h)B(g, h), for every g, h ∈ G (13)
for some bicharacter B(g, h). A quadratic phase gate is any diagonal unitary operation
acting on the standard basis as Dξ : |h〉 → ξ(h)|h〉, where ξ is a quadratic function of
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G. Similar to automorphism gates, we consider quadratic phase gates to be available as
black-box quantum gates.
Quantum Fourier transform. In contrast to both automorphism gates and quadratic
phase gates, which act on the entire system H, we will only consider settings where quantum
Fourier transforms never act on the black box portion HB of the total system. This a natural
restriction; in particular, (to our knowledge) in all existing quantum algorithms that do use
QFTs, these QFTs act on systems of the form HN1⊗· · ·⊗HNc . This is precisely the case we
consider here. To define the QFT, consider the Hilbert space HN with standard basis vectors
|x〉 with x ∈ ZN . The QFT FN over ZN is a unitary operation which acts on |ψ〉 =
∑
ψx|x〉
in HN as
FN |ψ〉 =
∑
y∈ZN
ψˆ(y)|y〉 with ψˆ(y) := 1√
N
∑
x∈ZN
e2πixyψ(x). (14)
In this work we will consider the quantum Fourier transform FNi to act on HNi , for any
system i = 1, . . . , a.
A normalizer circuit over G [1, 2] is any unitary circuit composed of normalizer gates. As
input state, we will consider any standard basis state |g〉 with g ∈ G. After all gates in the
circuit are applied, a measurement in the standard basis is performed. We do not consider
intermediate measurements. We also recall, as mentioned above, that all automorphism and
quadratic phase gates are to be given as black-box operations.
4.2 Infinite groups
Here we extend the definition of black box normalizer circuits to general Hilbert spaces of
the form (9). This will be technically somewhat more involved than the finite-dimensional
case. The main technical complication is not related the black-box portion HB of the Hilbert
space, but rather to the infinite-dimensional space HZ and, in particular, to the fact that
we work with two different bases in this space, labeled by two completely different groups Z
and T. We have already introduce these bases in section 3. The role of these bases in the
normalizer circuit model has been discussed in detail in our previous work [3], but we give
here a self-contained summarized account.
Designated bases BG. Consider a Hilbert space of the form (9). Fix any member G of
the family of 2a groups defined in (10). Note that G thus generally contains factors ZNi , Z,
T and B. We consider the corresponding group-element basis BG = {|g〉 : g ∈ G} as defined
in (11). We set BG to be (what we call) the designated basis of the computation. The group
G that labels BG choice of basis will determine what normalizer gates (read below). BG will
be the basis in which measurements are performed.
Automorphism gates. The definition of automorphism gates is similar to above, but now
the action of these gates is defined relative to the designated basis. That is, we consider a
group automorphism α : G→ G and define the corresponding automorphism gate Uα by its
action on the basis BG, as follows: Uα : |h〉 → |α(h)〉. As above, automorphism gates are
given as oracles. Furthermore, in the infinite case we impose that the group automorphism
must be a continuous map.
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Quadratic phase gates. The action of quadratic gates is also defined relative to the
designated basis. A function χ : G → U(1) is called a character if its continuous and if
χ(g + h) = χ(g)χ(h) for every g, h ∈ G. A function B : G × G → U(1) is said to be
a bicharacter if it is a character in both arguments. A function ξ : G → U(1) is called
quadratic if it is continuous and if
ξ(g + h) = ξ(g)ξ(h)B(g, h), for every g, h ∈ G (15)
for some bicharacter B(g, h). A quadratic phase gate is any diagonal unitary operation acting
on BG as Dξ : |h〉 → ξ(h)|h〉, where ξ is a quadratic function of G. As above, quadratic
gates are given as oracles.
Quantum Fourier transforms. In contrast to both automorphism gates and quadratic
phase gates, which leave the designated basis unchanged, the role of the quantum Fourier
transform (QFT) is precisely to change the designated basis BG (at a given time) into another
group-element basis BG′ . This transformation follows certain rules [3], described next.
Roughly speaking, the QFT ofHZ is a basis change between the standard and the Fourier
basis (6). Note that the QFT over ZN , which we introduced as a gate (14), could be defined
also in this way (as a change of basis). However, the Fourier transform has now more exotic
features than their finite-dimensional counterparts. First, strictly speaking, the QFT overHZ
is not a quantum gate: despite being a change of basis, it does not define a unitary rotation.
Second, there are actually two inequivalent Fourier transforms of HZ. These technicalities
deserve further discussion.
QFTs over HZ are not gates. In the case of HN , both the standard and the Fourier
basis have the same cardinality (since ZN is isomorphic to its character group) and such
a change of basis can be actively performed by means of a unitary rotation, which defines
the QFT over ZN . In the case of HZ, the standard basis {|x〉 : x ∈ Z} and Fourier basis
{|p〉 : p ∈ T} have different cardinality (recall section 3.2) and cannot be “rotated” into each
other. Therefore, the QFT, while corresponding to a change of basis, will as such not be a
unitary gate in the usual sense10. Because of this asymmetry, there are two QFTs, defined
as follows.
• QFT over Z. If the standard basis (Z basis) is the designated basis of HZ, states are
represented as
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈Z
ψ(x)|x〉. (16)
Gates are defined according to this (integer) basis, which is also our measurement basis.
When we say that the QFT over Z is applied to |ψ〉, we mean that the designated basis
is changed from the standard basis to the Fourier basis. The state does not actually
change (no gate is physically applied11), but the normalizer gates acting after the QFT
10Mathematically, this Fourier transform is a unitary transformation between two different functional
spaces, L2(Z) and L2(T). The latter two define one quantum mechanical system with two possible bases
(of Dirac-delta measures) labeled by Z and T. In the finite dimensional case, the picture is simpler because
the QFT is a unitary transformation of L2(ZN) onto itself. (These facts are consequences of the Plancherel
theorem for locally compact Abelian groups [61, 62].)
11We choose this notation to be consistent with our previously existing terminology [1, 2].
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will be associated with T (not Z), and measurements will be performed in the T basis.
We therefore ought to write the wavefunction of the state |ψ〉 in the Fourier basis:
|ψ〉 =
∫
T
dp ψˆ(p)|p〉 with ψˆ(p) :=
∑
x∈Z
e2πipxψ(x). (17)
• QFT over T. In the opposite case, the designated basis of HZ is the Fourier basis, in
which a state looks like
|ψ〉 =
∫
T
dp ψ(p)|p〉. (18)
When we say that the QFT over T is applied to |ψ〉, we mean that the designated basis
is changed from the Fourier basis to the standard basis. Like in the previous case, we
must re-express the state |ψ〉 in the new designated basis:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈Z
ψˆ(x)|x〉 with ψˆ(x) :=
∫
T
dp e2πipxψ(p). (19)
Note that, by definition, the QFT over Z may only be applied if the designated basis is the
standard basis and, conversely, the QFT over T may only be applied of the designated basis
is the Fourier basis.
Full and partial QFTs over G. We last consider the total Hilbert space H with designated
basis BG. We allow for the application of a QFT on any of the individual spaces HNi or
HZ in the tensor product decomposition of H (we call this a partial QFT ). The designated
basis is changed according to the rules described above on all subsystems HZ where a QFT
is applied. The full QFT over G is the combination of all partial QFTs acting on the smaller
registers.
4.3 The black-box normalizer circuit model
We are now ready to introduce normalizer circuits in precise terms. Roughly speaking, a
black-box normalizer circuit of size T is a quantum circuit C = UT · · ·U1 composed of
T normalizer gates Ui, which we have introduced in the previous sections. More precisely, a
normalizer circuit over G = Za+b × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ×B is a quantum circuit that acts on
a Hilbert space H associated with the group G.
H = HaZ ⊗HbZ ⊗ (HN1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HNc)⊗HB.
In this decomposition, the parameters a, b, c, Ni and the Abelian black-box group B can be
chosen arbitrarily.
To define a complete circuit model, we specify next the allowed inputs, gates and mea-
surements of the computation.
• Designated basis. In a normalizer computation there is no fixed “standard basis”, in
the usual sense of the word that comes from the standard model of quantum circuits
[147]. Instead, there is a designated basis BGt at every time step t of the circuit,
that is subject to change along the computation. BGt is restricted to be group-element
basis, as in equation (11).
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• Input states. The input states of a normalizer computation are elements of some
designated group basis BG0 at time zero12. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the registers HaZ and HbZ are fed, respectively, with standard-basis |n〉, n ∈ Z and
Fourier-basis states |p〉, p ∈ T. In our notation, this is equivalent to choosing the basis
BG0 with G0 = Za × Tb × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ×B.
• Structure of the circuit :
◦ At time t = 1, the gate U1 is applied, which is either an automorphism gate,
quadratic phase gate over G0 or a QFT. Recall that automorphism gates and
quadratic phase gates are given as black boxes. The designated basis is changed
from BG0 to BG1 , for some group G1 in the family (10), which is only different
from G0 if a QFT is applied (recall the update rules from the previous section).
◦ At time t = 2, the gate U1 is applied, which is, again, either an automorphism
gate, quadratic phase gate or a QFT over G1. The designated basis is changed
from BG1 to BG2 , for some group G2.
◦ The gates U3, . . . , Ut are considered similarly. We denote by BGt the designated
basis after application of Ut (for some group Gt in the family (10)), for all t =
3, . . . , T . Thus, after all gates have been applied, the designated basis is GT .
◦ After the circuit, a measurement in the designated basis GT is performed.
Precision requirements
In the model of quantum circuits above, input states and final measurements in the Fourier-
basis {|p〉, p ∈ T} of HZ can never be implemented with perfect accuracy, a limitation that
stems from the fact that the |p〉 states are unphysical. This can be quickly seen in two
ways: first, in the Z basis, these states are infinitely-spread plane-waves |p〉 = ∑ e2piizp|z〉;
second, in the T basis, they are infinitely-localized Dirac-delta pulses. Physically, preparing
Fourier-basis states or measuring in this basis perfectly would require infinite energy and
lead to infinite precision issues in our computational model.
In the algorithms we study in this work (namely, the order-finding algorithm in theorem
2), Fourier states over Z can be substituted with realistic physical approximations.
The degree of precision used in the process of Fourier state preparation is treated as a
computational resource. We model the precision used in a computation as follows.
Since our goal is to use the Fourier basis |p〉, p ∈ T, to represent information in a
computation, we require the ability to store and retrieve information in this continuous-
variable basis. Our assumption is that for any set X with cardinality d = |X|, we can divide
the continuous circle-group T spectrum into d equally sized sectors of length 1/d and use
them to represent the elements of X. More precisely, to each element of X we assign a
number in Zd. The element xi ∈ X with index i ∈ Zd is then represented by any state of
the subspace Vi,d = span{
∣∣ i
d +∆
〉
with |∆| < 12d}. We call the latter states d-approximate
Fourier states and refer to d as the precision level of the computation. We assume that these
states can be prepared and distinguished to any desired precision d in the following way:
1. State preparation assumption. Inputs |ψi〉 with at least 23 fidelity to some element
of Vi,d can be prepared for any i ∈ Zd.
12The results in this paper would still hold if the allowed inputs are periodic states, coset-states and, in
general, stabilizer states [1–3] if the stabilizer group of the input state is given as an input.
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2. Distinguishability assumption. The subspaces Vi,d can be reliably distinguished.
Note that d determines how much information is stored in the Fourier basis.
Definition 1 (Efficient use of precision13). A quantum algorithm that uses d-approximate
Fourier states to solve a computational problem with input size n is said to use an efficient
amount of precision if and only log d is upper bounded by some polynomial of n. Analo-
gously, an algorithm that stores information in the standard basis {|m〉, m ∈ Z} is said to
be efficient if the states with m larger than some threshold log (mmax) ∈ O(polyn) do not
play a role in the computation.
Classical encodings for normalizer gates
We finish this section discussing how the normalizer gates of a given normalizer circuit are
presented in a classical encoding. Since quantum Fourier transforms can be specified by
mere bit strings storing the circuit locations where they act, we focus on automorphism and
quadratic phase gates. We again let G = Za × Tb × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc ×B be the group that
defines the designated basis BG in a normalizer circuit and define m = a+ b+ c.
From now on, we restrict ourselves to studying group automorphisms and quadratic
functions which are efficiently computable rational functions. This limits the class of classical
functions that we consider.
1. Rational.14 An automorphism (or an arbitrary function) α : G → G is rational if it
returns rational outputs for all rational inputs. A quadratic function ξ is rational if it
can be written in the form ξ(g) = exp (2pii q(g)) where q is a rational function from G
into R modulo 2Z.
2. Efficiently computable. α and q can be computed by polynomial-time uniform
family of classical circuits {αi}, {qi}. All αi, qi are poly(m, i) size classical circuits
that query the black-box group oracle at most poly(m, i) times: their inputs are strings
of rational numbers whose numerators and denominators are represented by i classical
bits (their size is O(2i)). For any rational element g ∈ G that can be represented with
so many bits (if G contains factors of the form T these are approximated by fractions),
it holds that αi(g) = α(g) and qi(g) = q(g).
In certain cases (see section 5) we will consider groups like Z×N which, strictly speaking,
are not black-box groups (because polynomial time algorithms for group multiplication
for them are available and there is no need to introduce oracles). In those cases, the
queries to the black-box group oracle (in the above model) are substitute by some
efficient subroutine.
13Note that this definition is not necessary to define normalizer circuits but to discuss the physicality of
the model. We point out that there might be better ways to model precision than ours (which may, e.g., lead
to tighter bounds or more efficient algorithms), but our simple model is enough to derive our main results.
We advance that, even if these precision requirements turned out to be high in practice, there exist efficient
discretized qubit implementations of all the infinite-dimensional quantum algorithms that we study later in
the paper (cf. theorem 3).
14We expect this assumption not to be essential, but it simplifies our proofs by allowing us to use exact
arithmetic operations. Our stabilizer formalism in [3] can still be applied if the functions α, ξ are not rational,
and we expect some version of the simulation result (theorem 6) to hold even when trascendental numbers
are involved (taking carefully into account precision errors). It is an good question to explore whether an
exact simulation result may hold for algebraic numbers [148].
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We add a third restriction to the above.
3. Precision bound. For any q or α that acts on an infinite group a bound nout is
given so that for every i, the number of bits needed to specify the numerators and
denominators in the output of qi or αi exactly is at most i + nout. The bound nout
is independent of i and indicates how much the input of each function may grow or
shrink along the computation of the output15. This bound is used to correctly store
the output of maps α : Za → Za, α′ : Za → Ta and to detect whether the output of a
function α′′ : Tb → Tb might get truncated modulo 1.
The allowed automorphism gates Uα and quadratic phase gates Dξ are those associated
with efficiently computable rational functions α, ξ. We ask these unitaries to be effi-
ciently implementable as well16, by poly(m, i, nout)-size quantum circuits comprising at most
poly(m, i, nout) quantum queries of the group oracle. The variable i denotes the bit size used
to store the labels g of the inputs |g〉 and bounds the precision level d of the normalizer
computation, which we set to fulfill log d ∈ O(i + nout). The complexity of a normalizer
gate is measured by the number of gates and (quantum) oracle queries needed to implement
them.
In the next section 5, we will see particular examples of efficiently computable normalizer
gates. We will repeatedly make use of automorphism gates of the form
Uα|k1, . . . , km, x〉 −→
∣∣∣k1, . . . , km, bk11 · · · bkmm x〉
where ki are integers and bj , x are elements of some black-box group B. These gates are
allowed in our model, since there exist well-known efficient classical circuits for modular
exponentiation given access to a group multiplication oracle [139]. In this case, a precision
bound can be easily computed: since the infinite elements ki do not change in size and all the
elements of B are specified with strings of the same size, the output of α can be represented
with as many bits as the input and we can simply take nout = 0 (no extra bits are needed).
Many examples of efficiently computable normalizer gates were given in [1, 2], for de-
composed finite group ZN1 × · · · × ZNc . It was also shown in [1] that all normalizer gates
over such groups can be efficiently implemented.
5 Quantum algorithms
5.1 The discrete logarithm problem over Z×p
In this section we consider the discrete-logarithm problem studied by Shor [28]. For any
prime number p, let Z×p be the multiplicative group of non-zero integers modulo p. An
instance of the discrete-log problem over Z×p is determined by two elements a, b ∈ Z×p , such
that a generates the group Z×p . Our task is to find the smallest non-negative integer s that
15For infinite groups there is no fundamental limit to how much the output of α or q may grow/shrink
with respect to the input (this follows from the normal forms in [3]). The number nout parametrizes the
precision needed to compute the function. Similarly to 2., this assumption might me weakened if a treatment
for precision errors is incorporated in the model.
16Recall that, in finite dimensions, the gate cost of implementing a classical function α as a quantum gate
is at most the classical cost [147] and that computing q efficiently is enough to implement ξ using phase
kick-back tricks [33]. We expect these results to extend to infinite dimensional systems of the form HZ.
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is a solution to the equation as = b mod p; the number is called the discrete logarithm
s = loga b.
We now review Shor’s algorithm [28, 6] for this problem and prove our first result.
Theorem 1 (Discrete logarithm). Shor’s quantum algorithm for the discrete logarithm
problem over Z×p is a black-box normalizer circuit over the group Z2p−1 × Z×p .
Theorem 1 shows that black box normalizer circuits over finite Abelian groups can ef-
ficiently solve a problem for which no efficient classical algorithm is known. In addition, it
tells us that black-box normalizer circuits can render widespread public-key cryptosystems
vulnerable: namely, they break the Diffie-Helman key-exchange protocol [47], whose security
relies in the assumed classical intractability of the discrete-log problem.
Proof. Let us first recall the main steps in Shor’s discrete log algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (Shor’s algorithm for the discrete logarithm).
Input. Positive integers a, b, where Z×p = 〈a〉.
Output. The least nonnegative integer s such that as ≡ b (mod p).
We will use three registers indexed by integers, the first two modulo p − 1 and the last
modulo p. The first two registers will correspond to the additive group Zp−1, while the third
register will correspond to the multiplicative group Z×p . Two important ingredients of the
algorithm will be the unitary gates Ua : |s〉 → |sa〉 and Ub : |s〉 → |sb〉.
1. Initialization: Start in the state |0〉|0〉|1〉.
2. Create the superposition state 1p−1
∑p−1
x,y=0 |x〉|y〉|1〉, by applying the standard quantum
Fourier transform on the first two registers.
3. Apply the unitary U defined by U |x〉|y〉|z〉 = |x〉|y〉|zaxby〉, to obtain the state
1
p− 1
p−1∑
x,y=0
|x〉|y〉|axby〉
This is equivalent to applying the controlled-Uxa gate between the first and third reg-
isters, and the controlled-Uyb between the second and third registers.
4. Measure and discard the third register. This step generates a so-called coset state
1√
p− 1
p−1∑
k=0
|γ + ks,−k〉,
where γ is some uniformly random element of Zp−1 and s is the discrete logarithm.
5. Apply the quantum Fourier transform over Zp−1 to the first two registers, to obtain
1√
p− 1
p−1∑
k′=0
e2pii
k′γ
p−1
∣∣k′, k′s〉,
6. Measure the system in the standard basis to obtain a pair of the form (k′, k′s) mod p
uniformly at random.
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7. Classical post-processing. By repeating the above process n times, one can extract
the discrete logarithm s from these pairs with exponentially high probability (at least
1− 2−n), in classical polynomial time.
Note that the Hilbert space of the third register precisely corresponds to HB if we choose
the black-box group to be B = Z×p . It is now easy to realize that Shor’s algorithm for
discrete log is a normalizer circuit over Zp−1 × Zp−1 × Z×p : steps 2 and 4 correspond to
applying partial QFTs over Zp−1, and the gate U applied in state 3 is a group automorphism
over Zp−1 × Zp−1 × Z×p .
We stress that, in the proof above, there is no known efficient classical algorithm for
solving the group decomposition problem for the group Z×p (as we define it in section 5.5):
although, by assumption, we know that Z×p = 〈a〉 ∼= Zp−1, this information does not allow
us to convert elements from one representation to the other, since this requires solving the
discrete-logarithm problem itself. In other words, we are unable to compute classically the
group isomorphism Z×p ∼= Zp−1. In our version of the group decomposition problem, we
require the ability to compute this group isomorphism. For this reason, we treat the group
Z×p as a black-box group.
5.2 Shor’s factoring algorithm
In this section we will show that normalizer circuits can efficiently compute the order of
elements of (suitably encoded) Abelian groups. Specifically, we show how to efficiently solve
the order finding problem for every (finite) Abelian black-box group B [4] with normalizer
circuits. Due to the well-known classical reduction of the factoring problem to the problem of
computing orders of elements of the group Z×N , our result implies that black-box normalizer
circuits can efficiently factorize large composite numbers, and thus break the widely used
RSA public-key cryptosystem [48].
We briefly introduce the order finding problem over a black-box group B, that we
always assume to be finite and Abelian. In addition, we assume that the elements of the
black-box group can be uniquely encoded with n-bit strings, for some known n. The task
we consider is the following: given an element a of B, we want to compute the order |a| of a
(the smallest positive integer r with the property17 ar = 1). Our next theorem states that
this version of the order finding problem can be efficiently solved by a quantum computer
based on normalizer circuits.
Theorem 2 (Order finding over B). Let B be a finite Abelian black-box group with an
n-qubit encoding and HB be the Hilbert space associated with this group. Let Va be the unitary
that performs the group multiplication operation on HB: Va|x〉 = |ax〉. We denote by c -Va
the unitary that performs Va on HB controlled on the value of an ancillary register HZ:
|m,x〉 c−Ua−−−−−−−→ |m,amx〉, for any m in Z.
Assume that we can query an oracle that implements c -Va in one time step for any a ∈ B.
Then, there exists a hybrid version of Shor’s order-finding algorithm, which can compute
the order |a| of any a ∈ B efficiently, using normalizer circuits over the group Z × B and
classical post-processing. The algorithm runs in polynomial-time, uses an efficient amount
of precision and succeeds with high probability.
17Since B is finite, the order |a| is a well-defined number.
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In theorem 2, by “efficient amount of precision” we mean that instead of preparing Fourier
basis states ofHZ or measuring on this (unphysical) basis, it is enough to use realistic physical
approximations of these states (cf. section 4).
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that a generating set of B with O(n) elements is given
(otherwise we could generate one efficiently probabilistically by sampling elements of B).
We divide the proof into two steps. In the first part, we give an infinite-precision quan-
tum algorithm to randomly sample elements from the set Outa = { k|a| : k ∈ Z} that uses
normalizer circuits over the group Z×B in polynomially many steps. In this first algorithm,
we assume that Fourier basis states of HZ can be prepared perfectly and that there are no
physical limits in measurement precision; the outcomes k/|a| will be stored with floating
point arithmetic and with finite precision. The algorithm allows one to extract the period
|a| efficiently by sampling fractions k/|a| (quantumly) and then using a continued fraction
expansion (classically).
In the second part of the proof, we will remove the infinite precision assumption.
Our first algorithm is essentially a variation of Shor’s algorithm for order finding [28]
with one key modification: whereas Shor’s algorithm uses a large n-qubit register Hn2 to
estimate the eigenvalues of the unitary Va, we will replace this multiqubit register with a
single infinite dimensional Hilbert space HZ. The algorithm is hybrid in the sense that it
involves both continuous- and discrete-variable registers. The key feature of this algorithm
is that, at every time step, the implemented gates are normalizer gates, associated with the
groups Z×Z×N and T×Z×N (which are, themselves, related via the partial Fourier transforms
FZ and FT). The algorithm succeeds with constant probability.
Algorithm 2 (Hybrid order finding with infinite precision).
Input. A black box (finite abelian) group B, and an element a ∈ B.
Output. The order s of a in B, i.e. the least positive integer s such that as = 1.
We will use multiplicative notation for the black box group B, and additive notation for
all other subgroups.
1. Initialization: Initialize HZ on the Fourier basis state |0〉 with 0 ∈ T, and HB on the
state |1〉, with 1 ∈ B. In our formalism, we will regard |0, 1〉 as a standard-basis state
of the basis labeled by T×B.
2. Apply the Fourier transform FT to the register HZ. This changes the designated basis
of this register to be the one labeled by the group Z. The state |0〉 in the new basis is
an infinitely-spread comb of the form
∑
m∈Z |m〉.
3. Let the oracle Va act jointly on HZ × HB; then the state is mapped in the following
manner: ∑
m∈Z
|m〉|1〉 c -Va−−−−−−→
∑
m∈Z
|m,am〉. (20)
Note that, in our formalism, the oracle c -Va can be regarded as an automorphism
gate Uα. Indeed, the gate implements a classical invertible function on the group
α(m,x) = (m,amx). The function is, in addition, a continuous18 group automorphism,
18This is vacuously true: since the group G := Z×B is discrete, any functtion f : G→ G is continuous.
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since
α ((m,x)(n, y)) = α(m+ n, xy) = (m+ n, (am+n)(xy))
= (m+ n, (amx)(any)) = (m,amx)(n, any) (21)
= α(m,x)α(n, y).
4. Measure and discard the register HB. Say we obtain as as the measurement outcome.
Note that the function am is periodic with period r = |a|, the order of the element.
Due to periodicity, the state after measuring as will be of the form∑
j∈Z
|s+ jr〉
 |as〉. (22)
After dicarding HB we end up in a periodic state
∑ |s+ jr〉 which encodes r = |a|.
5. Apply the Fourier transform FZ to the register HZ. We work again in the Fourier basis
of HZ, which is labelled by the circle group T. The periodic state
∑ |s+ jr〉 in the
dual T basis reads [149]
r−1∑
k=0
e2pii
sk
r
∣∣k
r
〉
(23)
6. Measure HZ in the Fourier basis (the basis labeled by T). Since we that the initial
state of the computation is as close to |0〉 as we wish, the wavefunction of the final
state (23) is sharply peaked around values p ∈ T of the form k/r. As a result, a high
resolution measurement will let us sample these numbers (within some floating-point
precision window ∆) nearly uniformly at random.
7. Classical postprocessing: Repeat steps 1-7 a few times and use a (classical) continued-
fraction expansion algorithm [147, 150] to extract the order r from the randomly sam-
pled multiples {ki/r}i. This can be done, for instance, with an algorithm from [151]
that obtains r with constant probability after sampling two numbers k1r ,
k2
r , if the
measurement resolution is high enough: ∆ ≤ 1/2r2 is enough for our purposes.
Manifestly, there is a strong similarity between algorithm 2 and Shor’s factoring algo-
rithm: the quantum Fourier transforms FT in our algorithm FZ play the role of the discrete
Fourier transorm F2n , and c -Va acts as the modular exponentation gate [28]. In fact, one
can regard algorithm 2 as a “hybrid” version of Shor’s algorithm combining both continuous
and discrete variable registers. The remarkable feature of this version of Shor’s algorithm is
that the quantum part of the algorithm 1-6 is a normalizer computation.
Algorithm 2 is efficient if we just look at the number of gates it uses. However, the
algorithm is inefficient in that it uses infinitely-spread Fourier states |p〉 =∑m∈Z e−2piipm|m〉
(which are unphysical and cannot be prepared with finite computational resources) and
arbitrarily precise measurements. We finish the proof of theorem 2 by giving an improved
algorithm that does not rely on unphysical requirements.
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Algorithm 3 (Hybrid order finding with finite precision).
1-2 Initialization: Initialize HB to |1〉. The register HZ will begin in an approximate
Fourier basis state
∣∣∣0˜〉 = 1√
2M+1
∑+M
−M |m〉, i.e. a square pulse of length 2M +1 in the
integer basis, centered at 0. This step simulates steps 1-2 in algorithm 2.
3-4 Repeat steps 3-4 of algorithm 2. The state after obtaining the measurement outcome
as is now different due to the finite “length” of the comb
∑M
m=0 |m〉; we obtain
|ψ〉 = 1√
L
Lb∑
−La
|s+ jr〉, (24)
where L = La+Lb+1 and s is obtained nearly uniformly at random from {0, . . . , r−1}.
The values La, Lb are positive integers of of the form ⌊M/r⌋ − ǫ with −2 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0 (the
particular value of ǫ depends on s, but it is irrelevant in our analysis). Consequently,
we have L = 2⌊M/r⌋ − (ǫa + ǫb).
5 Apply the Fourier transform FZ to the register HZ . The wavefunction of the final
state ψˆ is the Fourier transform of the wavefunction ψ of (24). We compute ψˆ using
formula (17):
ψˆ(p) =
∑
x∈Z
e2piipxψ(x) =
1√
L
Lb∑
−La
e2piip(s+jr) =
1√
L
(
e2piips
) e2piipr(Lb+1) − e−2piiprLa
e2piipr − 1
=
e
2piip
(
s+
Lb−La
2
)
√
L
sin (πLpr)
sin (πpr)
=
e
2piip
(
s+
Lb−La
2
)
√
L
DL,r(p) (25)
(to derive the equation, we apply the summation formula of the geometric series and
re-express the result in terms of the Dirichlet kernel [61]
DL,r(p) =
sin (πLpr)
sin (πpr)
. (26)
6 Measure HZ in the Fourier basis. We show now that, if the resolution is high enough,
then the probability distribution of measurement outcomes will be “polynomially close”
to the one obtained in the infinite precision case (23). Intuitively, this is a consequence
of the fact that in the limit M → ∞ (when the initial state becomes an infinitely-
spread comb), we have also L → ∞ and that the function DL, r(p) converges to a
train
∑r−1
k=0 δk/r(p) of Dirac measures [61]. In addition, for a high finite value of M ,
we find that the probability of obtaining some outcome p within a ∆ = 1Lr window of
a fraction kr is also high.
Pr(|p− kr | ≤ ∆2 ) =
1
L
∫ +∆2
−∆2
sin2 (πLpr)
sin2 (πpr)
dp ≥ ∆L
sin2
(
pi
2
)
sin2
(
pi
2L
) ≥ 4
pi
2r
, (27)
where we use the mean value theorem and the bound sin(x)2 ≤ x2. It follows that
with constant probability (larger than 4/π2 ≈ 0.41) the measurement will output some
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outcome ∆2 -close to a number of the form k/r. (A tighter lower bound of 2/3 for the
success probability can be obtained by evaluating the integral numerically.)
Lastly, note that although the derivation of (27) implicitly assumes that the finial
measurement is infinitely precise, it is enough to implement measurements with res-
olution close to ∆. Due to the peaked shape of the final distribution (27), it follows
that Θ( 1M ) resolution is enough if our task is to sample
∆
2 -estimates of these fractions
nearly uniformly at random; this scaling is efficient as a function of M (cf. section 4).
7 Classical postprocessing: We now set M (the length of the initial comb state) to
be large enough so that ∆2 =
1
2Lr ≤ 12r2 ; taking logM = O(polyn) is enough for our
purposes. With such an M , the measurement step 6 will output a number p that is
1
2r2
close to a kr with high probability, which can be increased to be arbitrarily close
to 1 with a few repetitions. We then proceed as in step 7 of algorithm 2 to compute
the order r.
Shor’s algorithm as a normalizer circuit
Our discussion in the previous section reveals strong a resemblance between our hybrid
normalizer quantum algorithm for order finding and Shor’s original quantum algorithm for
this problem [28]: indeed, both quantum algorithms employ remarkably similar circuitry. In
this section we show that this resemblance is actually more than a mere fortuitous analogy,
and that, in fact, one can understand Shor’s original order-finding algorithm as a discretized
version of our finite-precision hybrid algorithm for order finding 2.
Theorem 3 (Shor’s algorithm as a normalizer circuit). Shor’s order-finding algorithm
[28] provides an efficient discretized implementation of our hybrid normalizer algorithm 3.
Note that the theorem does not imply that all possible quantum algorithms for order
finding are normalizer circuits (or discretized versions of some normalizer circuit). What it
shows is that the one first found by Shor in [28] does exhibit such a structure.
Proof. Our approach will be to show explicitly that the evolution of the initial quantum state
in Shor’s algorithm is analogous to that of the initial state in algorithm 3 if we discretize
the computation. Recall that Shor’s algorithm implements a quantum phase estimation [41]
for the unitary Va. Let D be the dimension of the Hilbert space used to record such phase.
We assume D to be odd19 and write D = 2M +1. Then Shor’s algorithm can be written as
follows:
1. Initialize the state |0, 1〉 on the Hilbert space HD ×HZ×
N
.
2. Apply the discrete Fourier transform FZD on HD to obtain
D−1∑
m=0
|m〉|1〉 =
M∑
−M
|m〉|1〉. (28)
So far, we have simulated step 1 in algorithm 3 by constructing the same periodic state.
These first two steps are also clearly analogous to steps 1-2 in algorithm 2.
19This choice is not essential, neither in Shor’s algorithm nor in algorithm 3, but it simplifies the proof.
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3-4 Apply the modular exponentiation gate Ume, which is the following unitary [28]
Ume|m,x〉 = |m,amx〉, (29)
to the state. Measure the register H
Z
×
N
in the standard basis. We obtain, again, a
quantum state of the form (24), with L ≤ D.
6 We apply the discrete Fourier transform FZD to the register HZD again. We claim
now that the output state will be a discretized version of (25) due to a remarkable
mathematical correspondence between Fourier transforms. Note that any quantum
state |ψ〉 of the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space HZ can be regarded as a quantum
state of HD given that the support of |ψ〉 is limited to the standard basis states
|0〉, |±1〉, . . . , |±M〉. Let us denote the latter state |ψD〉 to distinguish both. Then, we
observe a correspondence between letting FZ act on |ψ〉 and letting FZD act on |ψD〉.
ψˆ(p) =
x=+M∑
x=−M
e2piipxψ(x) ←→ ψˆD(k) =
x=+M∑
x=−M
e2pii
kx
D ψD(x) (30)
The correspondence (equation 30) tells us that, since we have ψ(x) = ψD(x), it follows
that the Fourier transformed function ψˆD(k) is precisely the function ψˆ(p) evaluated
at points of the form p = kD . The final state can be written as
D−1∑
k=0
ψˆ
(
k
D
) |k〉. (31)
which is, indeed, a discretized version of (25).
7-8 The last steps of Shor’s algorithm are identical to 7-8 in algorithm 3, with the only
difference being that the wavefunction (31) is now a discretization of (25). The prob-
ability of measuring a number k such that kD is close to a multiple of the form
k′
r will
again be high, due to the properties of the Dirichlet kernel (26). Indeed, one can show
(see, e.g. [6]) with an argument similar to (27) that, by setting D = N2, the algorithm
outputs with constant probability and almost uniformly a fraction kD among the two
closest fraction to some value of the form k/r (see e.g. [28] for details). The period r
can be recovered, again, with a continued fraction expansion.
Normalizer gates over ∞ groups are necessary to factorize
At this point, it is a natural question to ask whether it is necessary at all to replace the
Hilbert space Hn2 with an infinite-dimensional space HZ with an integer basis in order to be
able to factorize with normalizer circuits. We discuss in this section that, in the view of the
authors, this is a key indispensable ingredient of our proof.
We begin our discussion by showing rigorously, in the black-box set-up, that no quantum
algorithm for factoring based on modular exponentation gates (controlled Va rotations) can
be efficiently implemented with normalizer circuits over finite Abelian groups, in a strong
sense.
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Theorem 4. Let HM be the Hilbert space with basis {|0〉, . . . , |M − 1〉} and dimension M .
Let B be an Abelian black-box group with associated Hilbert space HB. Consider the com-
posite Hilbert space H = HM × HB and define Ume to be the unitary gate on H defined
as Ume|m,x〉 = |m,amx〉, where a, x ∈ B and m ∈ ZM . Then, unless M is a multiple of
the order of a, there does not exist any normalizer circuit over H (even of exponential size)
satisfying ‖C − Ume‖op ≤ 1− 2−1/2.
We prove the theorem in appendix A. We highlight that a similar result was proven
in [1, theorem 2]: that normalizer circuits over groups of the form Z2n × ZN also fail to
approximate the modular exponentiation. Also, we point out that it is easy to see that the
converse of theorem 4 is also true: if |a| divides M , then an argument similar to (49) shows
that (m,x)→ (m,amx) is a group automorphism of ZM×B, and the gate Umf automatically
becomes a normalizer automorphism gate.
The main implication of theorem 4 is that finite-group normalizer circuits cannot imple-
ment nor approximate the quantum modular exponentiation gate between HB, playing the
role of the target system, and some ancillary control system, unless a multiple M = λ|a| of
the order of a is known in advance. Yet the problem of finding multiples of orders is at least
as hard as factoring and order-finding : for B = Z×N , a subroutine to find multiples of orders
can be used to efficiently compute classically a multiple of the order of the group ϕ(N),
where ϕ is the Euler totient function, and it is known that factoring is polynomial-time
reducible to the problem of finding a single multiple of the form λϕ(N) [31].
We arrive to the conclusion that, unless we are in the trivial case where we know how to
factorize in advanced, a factoring algorithm based on finite-group normalizer gates cannot
comprise controlled-Va rotations. We further conjecture that any other approach based on
finite-group normalizer gates cannot work either.
Conjecture 1. Unless factoring is contained in BPP, there is no efficient quantum algorithm
to solve the factoring problem using only normalizer circuits over finite Abelian groups (even
when these are allowed to be black-box groups) and classical pre- and post-processing.
We back up our conjecture with two facts. On one hand, Shor’s algorithm for factoring
[28] (to our knowledge, the only quantum algorithm for factoring thus far) uses a modular
exponentiation gate to estimate the phases of the unitary Va, and these gates are hard to
implement with finite-group normalizer circuits due to theorem 4. On the other hand, the
reason why this does works for the group Z seems to be, in the view of the authors, intimately
related to the fact that the order-finding problem can be naturally casted as an instance of
the Abelian hidden subgroup problem over Z (see also section 5.4). Note that, although
one can always cast the order-finding problem as an HSP over any finite group Zλϕ(N) for an
integer λ, this formulation of the problem is unnatural in our setting, as it requires (again)
the prior knowledge of a multiple of ϕ(N), which we could use to factorize and find orders
classically without the need of a quantum computer [31].
5.3 Elliptic curves
In the previous sections we have seen that black-box normalizer circuits can compute discrete
logarithm in Z×p and break the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In the proof, we showed
that Shor’s algorithm for this problem decomposes naturally in terms of normalizer gates
over Z×p , treated as a black-box group.
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It is known that Shor’s algorithm can be adapted in order to compute discrete logarithms
over arbitrary black-box groups. In particular, this can be done for the group of solutions E
of an elliptic curve [32–34], thereby rendering elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) vulnerable.
Efficient unique encodings and fast multiplication algorithms for these groups are known,
so that they can be formally treated as black-box groups. In this section, we show that
a quantum algorithm given by Proos and Zalka [32] to compute discrete logarithms over
elliptic curves can be implemented with black-box normalizer circuits.
Basic notions
To begin, we review some rudiments of the theory of elliptic curves. For simplicity, our survey
focuses only on the particular types of elliptic curves that were studied in [32], over fields with
characteristic different than 2 and 3. Our discussion applies equally to the (more general)
cases considered in [33, 34], although the definition of the elliptic curve group operation
becomes more cumbersome in such settings20. For more details on the subject, in general,
we refer the reader to [6, 152].
Let p > 3 be prime and let K be the field defined by endowing the set Zp with the
addition and multiplication operations modulo p. An elliptic curve E over the field K s a
finite Abelian group formed by the solutions (x, y) ∈ K ×K to an equation
C : y2 = x3 + αx+ β (32)
together with a special element O called the “point at infinity”; the coefficients α, β in this
equation live in the field K. The discriminant ∆ := −16(4α3 + 27β2) is nonzero, ensuring
that the curve is non-singular. The elements of E are endowed with a commutative group
operation. If P ∈ E then P +O = O+P = P . The inverse element −P of P is obtained by
the reflection of P about the x axis. Given two elements P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ) ∈ E,
the element P +Q is defined via the following rule:
P +Q =
{
O if P = (xP , yP ) = (xQ,−yQ) = −Q,
−R otherwise (read below). (33)
In the case P 6= Q, the point R is computed as follows:
xR = λ
2 − xP − xQ
yR = yP − λ(xP − xR)
λ :=
{ yQ−yP
xQ−xP if P 6= Q
3x2
P
+α
2yP
if P = Q and yP 6= 0
R can also be defined, geometrically, to be the “intersection between the elliptic curve and
the line through P and Q” (with a minus sign) [6].
It is not hard to check form the definitions above that the elliptic-curve group E is finite
and Abelian; from a computational point of view, the elements of E can be stored with
n ∈ O(log |K|) bits and the group operation can be computed in O(polyn) time. Therefore,
the group E can be treated as a black box group.
Finally, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) over an elliptic curve is defined in a
way analogous to the Z×p case, although now we use additive notation: given a, b ∈ E such
that xa = b for some integer x; our task is to find the least nonnegative integer s with that
property. The elliptic-curve DLP is believed to be intractable for classical computers and
can be used to define cryptosystems analog to Diffe-Hellman’s [6].
20Correspondingly, the complexity of performing group multiplications in [33, 34] is greater.
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Finding discrete logarithms over elliptic curves with normalizer circuits
In this section we review Proos-Zalka’s quantum approach to solve the DLP problem over an
elliptic curve [32]; their quantum algorithm is, essentially, a modification of Shor’s algorithm
to solve the DLP over Z×p , which we covered in detail in section 5.1.
Our main contribution in this section is that Proos-Zalka’s algorithm can be imple-
mented with normalizer circuits over the group Z×Z×E. The proof reduces to combining
ideas from sections 5.1 and 5.2 and will be sketched in less detail.
Algorithm 4 (Proos-Zalka’s [32]).
Input. An elliptic curve with associated group E (the group operation is defined as per (33)),
and two points a, b ∈ E. It is promised that sa = b for some nonnegative integer s.
Output. Find the least nonnegative integer s such that sa = b.
1. We use a register HE, where E is the group associated with the elliptic curve (32), and
two ancillary registersH of dimension N = 2n, associated with the group A = ZN×ZN .
The computation begins in the state |0, 0, O〉, where (0, 0) ∈ A and O ∈ E.
2. Fourier transforms are applied to the ancillas to create the superposition
∑
(x,y)∈A |x, y,O〉.
3. The following transformation is applied unitarily:∑
(x,y)∈A
|x, y,O〉 c -U−−−−−−→
∑
(x,y)∈A
|x, y, xa+ yb〉. (34)
4. Fourier transforms are applied again over the ancillas and then measured, obtaining an
outcome of the form (x′, y′). These outcomes contain enough information to extract
the number s, with similar post-processing techniques to those used in Shor’s DLP
algorithm.
Algorithm 4 is not a normalizer circuit over ZN × ZN × E. Similarly to the factoring
case, the algorithm would become a normalizer circuit if the classical transformation in step
3 was an automorphism gate; however, for this to occur, N needs to be a common multiple
of the orders of a and b (the validity of these claims follows with similar arguments to those
in section 5.2). In view of our results in sections 5.1 and 5.2, one can easily come up with
two approaches to implement algorithm 1 using normalizer gates.
(a) The first approach would be to use our normalizer version of Shor’s algorithm (theorem
2) to find the orders of the elements a and b: normalizer gates over Z × E would be
used in this step. Then, the number N in algorithm 4 can be set so that all the gates
involved become normalizer gates over ZN × ZN × E.
(b) Alternatively, one can choose not to compute the orders by making the ancillas infinite
dimensional, just as we did in algorithm 2. The algorithm becomes a normalizer circuit
over Z× Z×E: as in algorithm 2, the ancillas are initialized to the zero Fourier basis
state, and the discrete Fourier transforms are replaced by QFTs over T (in step 2) and
Z (in step 4). A finite precision version of the algorithm can be obtained in the same
fashion as we derived algorithm 2. Proos-Zalka’s original algorithm could, again, be
interpreted as a discretization of the resulting normalizer circuit.
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5.4 The hidden subgroup problem
All problems we have considered this far—finding discrete logarithms and orders of Abelian
group elements—fit inside a general class of problems known as hidden subgroup problems
over Abelian groups [43–46]. Most quantum algorithms discovered in the early days of quan-
tum computation solve problems that can be recasted as Abelian HSPs, including Deutsch’s
problem [37], Simon’s [38], order finding and discrete logarithms [28], finding hidden linear
functions [39], testing shift-equivalence of polynomials [40], and Kitaev’s Abelian stabilizer
problem [41, 42].
In view of our previous results, it is natural to ask how many of these problems can
be solved within the normalizer framework. In this section we show that a well-known
quantum algorithm that solves the Abelian HSPs (in full generality) can be modeled as a
normalizer circuit over an Abelian group O. Unlike previous cases, the group involved in
this computation cannot be regarded as a black-box group, as it will not be clear how to
perform group multiplications of its elements. This fact reflects the presence of oracular
functions with unknown structure are present in the algorithm, to which the group O is
associated; thus, we call O an oracular group. We will discuss, however, that this latter
difference does not seem to be very substantial, and that the Abelian HSP algorithm can be
naturally regarded as a normalizer computation.
The quantum algorithm for the Abelian HSP
In the Abelian hidden subgroup problem we are given a function f : G→ X from an Abelian
finite21 group G to a finite set X. The function f is constant on cosets of the form g +H,
where H is a subgroup “hidden” by the function; moreover, f is different between different
cosets. Given f as a black-box, our task is to find such a subgroup H.
The Abelian HSP is a hard problem for classical computers, which need to query the
oracle f a superpolynomial amount of times in order to identify H [6]. In contrast, a quantum
computer can determine H in polynomial time O(polylog |G|), and using the same amount
of queries to the oracle. We describe next a celebrated quantum algorithm for this task
[43, 44, 35]. The algorithm is efficient given that the group G is explicitly given22 in the
form G = Zd1 × · · · × Zdm [35, 36, 46].
Algorithm 5 (Abelian HSP).
Input. An explicitly decomposed finite abelian group G = Zd1 × · · · × Zdm , and oracular
access to a function f : G → X for some set X. f satisfies the promise that f(g1) = f(g2)
iff g1 = g2 + h for some h ∈ H, where H ⊆ G is some fixed but unknown subgroup of G.
Output. A generating set for H.
1. Apply the QFT over the group G to an initial state |0〉 in order to obtain a uniform
superposition over the elements of the group
∑
g∈G |g〉.
2. Query the oracle f in an ancilla register, creating the state
1√
|G|
∑
g∈G
|g, f(g)〉 (35)
21In this section we assume G to be finite for simplicity. For a case where G is infinite, we refer the reader
back to section 5.2, where we studied the order finding problem (which is a HSP over Z).
22If the group G is not given in a factorized form, the Abelian HSP may still be solved by applying
Cheung-Mosca’s algorithm to decompose G (see next section).
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3. The QFT over G is applied to the first register, which is then measured.
4. After repeating 1-3 polynomially many times, the obtained outcomes can be postpro-
cessed classically to obtain a generating set of H with exponentially high probability
(we refer the reader to [86] for details on this classical part).
We now claim that the quantum part of algorithm 5 is a normalizer circuit, of a slightly
more general kind than the ones we have already studied. The normalizer structure of the
HSP-solving quantum circuit is, however, remarkably well-hidden compared to the other
quantum algorithms that we have already studied. It is indeed a surprising fact that there
is any normalizer structure in the circuit, due to the presence of an oracular function, whose
inner structure appears to be completely unknown to us!
Theorem 5 (The Abelian HSP algorithm is a normalizer circuit.). In any Abelian
hidden subgroup problem, the subgroup-hiding property of the oracle function f induces a
group structure O in the set X. With respect to this hidden “linear structure”, the function f
becomes a group homomorphism, and the HSP-solving quantum circuit becomes a normalizer
circuit over G×O.
The proof is the content of the next two sections.
Unweaving the hidden-subgroup oracle
The key ingredient in the proof of the theorem (which is the content of the next section)
is to realize that the oracle f cannot fulfill the subgroup-hiding property without having a
hidden homomorphism structure, which is also present in the quantum algorithm.
First, we show that f induces a group structure on X. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the function f is surjective, so that imf = X. (If this is not true, we can
redefine X to be the image of f .) Thus, for every element x ∈ X, the preimage f−1(x) is
contained in G, and is a coset of the form f−1(x) = gx+H, where H is the hidden subgroup
and f(gx) = x. With these observations in mind, we can define a group operation in X as
follows:
x · y = f˜ (f−1(x) + f−1(y)) . (36)
In (36) we denote by f˜ the function f˜(x+H) = f(x) that sends cosets x+H to elements of
X. The subgroup-hiding property guarantees that this function is well-defined; moreover, f
and f˜ are related via f(x) = f˜(x+H). The addition operation on cosets f−1(x) = gx +H
and f−1(y) = gy +H is just the usual group operation of the quotient group G/H [29]:
f−1(x) + f−1(y) = (gx +H) + (gy +H) = (gx + gy) +H. (37)
By combining the two expressions, we get an explicit formula for the group multiplication in
terms of coset representatives: x · y = f(gx + gy). It is routine to check that this operation
is associative and invertible, turning X into a group, which we denote by O. The neutral
element of the group is the string e in X such that e = f(0) = f(H), which we show
explicitly:
x · e = e · x = f˜ (f−1(x) + f−1(e)) = f˜ (f−1(x) +H) = x (38)
The group O is manifestly finite and Abelian—the latter property is due to the fact that the
addition (37) is commutative.
31
Lastly, it is straightforward to check that the oracle f is a group homomorphism
from G to O: for any g, h ∈ G let x := f(g) and y := f(h), we have
f(g + h) = f˜ (g + h+H) = f˜ ((g +H) + (h+H)) = f˜
(
f−1 (x) + f−1 (y)
)
(39)
= x · y = f(g) · f(h). (40)
It follows from the first isomorphism theorem in group theory [29] that O is isomorphic to
the quotient group G/H via the map f˜ .
The HSP quantum algorithm is a normalizer circuit
We will now analyze the role of the different quantum gates used in algorithm 5 and see that
they are examples of normalizer gates over the group G×O, where O is the oracular group
that we have just introduced.
The Hilbert space underlying the computation can be written as HG ⊗ HO with the
standard basis {|g, x〉 : g ∈ G, x ∈ O}. associated with this group. We will initialize the
ancillary registers to the state |e〉, where e = f(0) is the neutral element of the group; the
total state at step 1 will be |0, e〉. The Fourier transforms in steps 1 and 3 are just partial
QFTs over the group G, which are normalizer gates. The quantum state at the end of step
1 is
∑ |g, e〉.
Next, we look now at step 2 of the computation:∑
|g, e〉 −→ 1√|G|∑
g∈G
|g, f(g)〉. (41)
This step can be implemented by a normalizer automorphism gate defined as follows. Let
α : G×O → G×O be the function α(g, x) = (g, f(g) · x). Using the fact that f : G→ O is
a group homomorphism (39), it is easy to check that α is a group automorphism of G×O.
Then the evolution at step 2 corresponds to the action of the automorphism gate Uα:
Uα
∑
g
|g, e〉 =
∑
g
|α(g, e)〉 =
∑
g
|g, f(g) · e〉 =
∑
g
|g, f(g)〉. (42)
Of course, our choice to begin the computation in the state |0, e〉 and to apply Uα in step 3
is only one possible way to implement the first three steps of the algorithm. We could have
alternatively initialized the computation on some |0, 0〉 state and used a slightly different
gate Uadd =
∑ |g, x + f(g)〉〈g, x| in step 3. The latter sequence of gates can however be
regarded as an exact gate-by-gate simulation of the former, so that it is perfectly licit to call
the algorithm a normalizer computation—at least up to steps 3 and 4.
Finally, note that in the last step of the algorithm we measure the HG in the standard
basis like a normalizer computation. Therefore, every step in the quantum algorithm 5
corresponds to one of the allowed operations in a normalizer circuit over G × O. This
finishes the proof of theorem 5.
The oracular group O is not a black-box group (but almost)
We ought to stress, at this point, that although theorem 5 shows that the Abelian HSP
quantum algorithm is a normalizer computation over an Abelian group G×O, the oracular
group O is not a black-box group (as defined in section 2.4), since it is not clear how
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to compute the group operation (36), due to our lack of knowledge about the oracular
function which defines the multiplication rule. Yet, even in the absence of an efficiently
computable group operation, we regard it natural to call the Abelian HSP quantum algorithm
a normalizer circuit over G×O. Our reasons are multi-fold.
First, there is a manifest strong similarity between the quantum circuit in algorithm 5 and
the other normalizer circuits that we have studied in previous sections, which suggests that
normalizer operations naturally capture the logic of the Abelian HSP quantum algorithm.
Second, it is in fact possible to argue that, although O is not a black-box group, it
behaves effectively as a black-box group in the quantum algorithm. Observe that, although
it is true that one cannot generally compute x · y for arbitrary x, y ∈ O, it is indeed always
possible to multiply any element x by the neutral element e, since the computation is trivial
in this case: x · e = e · x = x. Similarly, in the previous section, it is not clear at all how to
implement the unitary transformation Uα|g, x〉 = |g, f(g) · x〉 for arbitrary inputs. However,
for the restricted set of inputs that we need in the quantum algorithm (which is just the state
|e〉), it is trivial to implement the unitary, for in this case Uα|g, e〉 = |g, f(g)〉; since quantum
queries to the oracle function are allowed (as in step 2 of the algorithm), the unitary can be
simulated by such process, regardless of how it is implemented. Consequently, the circuit
effectively behaves as a normalizer circuit over a black-box group.
Third, although the oracular model in the black-box normalizer circuit setting is slightly
different from the one used in the Abelian HSP they are still remarkably close to each other.
To see this, let xi be the elements of X defined as xi := f(ei) where ei is the bit string
containing a 1 in the ith position and zeroes elsewhere. Since the eis form a generating set
of G, the xis generate the group O. Moreover, the value of the function f evaluated on an
element g =
∑
g(i)ei is f(g) = x
g(1)
1 x
g(2)
2 · · · xg(m)m , since f is a group homomorphism. It
follows from this expression that the group homomorphism is implicitly multiplying elements
of the group O. We cannot use this property to multiply elements of O ourselves, since
everything happens at the hidden level. However, this observation shows that the assuming
that f is computable is tightly related to the assumption that we can multiply in O, although
slightly weaker. (See also the next section.)
Finally, we mention that this very last feature can be exploited to extend several of our
main results, which we derive in the black-box setting, to the more-general “HSP oracular
group setting” (although proofs become more technical). For details, we refer the reader to
sections 6-8 and appendix C.
A connection to a result by Mosca and Ekert
Prior to our work, it was observed by Mosca and Ekert [45, 35] that f must have a hidden
homomorphism structure, i.e. that f can be decomposed as E ◦ α where α is a group
homomorphism between G and another Abelian group Q ∼= G/H, and E is a one-to-one
hiding function from Q to the set X. In this decomposition, E hides the homomorphism
structure of the oracle.
Our result differs from Mosca-Ekert’s in that we show that X itself can always be viewed
as a group, with a group operation that is induced by the oracle, with no need to know the
decomposition E ◦ α.
It is possible to relate both results as follows. Since both Q and O are isomorphic to
G/H, they are also mutually isomorphic. Explicitly, if β is an isomorphism from Q to G/H
(this map depends on the particular decomposition f = E ◦α), then Q and O are isomorphic
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via the map f˜ ◦ β.
5.5 Decomposing finite Abelian groups
As mentioned earlier, there is a quantum algorithm for decomposing Abelian groups, due
to Cheung and Mosca [35, 36]. In this section, we will introduce this problem, and present
a quantum algorithm that solves it, which uses only black-box normalizer circuits supple-
mented with classical computation. The algorithm we give is based on Cheung-Mosca’s, but
it reveals some additional information about the structure of the black-box group. We will
refer to it as the extended Cheung-Mosca’s algorithm.
The group decomposition problem
In this work, we define the group decomposition problem as follows. The input of the
problem is a list of generators α = (α1, · · · , αk) of some Abelian black-box group B. Our
task is to return a group-decomposition table for B. A group-decomposition table is a tuple
(α, β,A,B, c) consisting of the original string α and four additional elements:
(a) A new generating set β = β1, . . . , βℓ with the property B = 〈β1〉 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 〈βℓ〉. We will
say that these new generators are linearly independent.
(b) An integer vector c containing the orders of the linearly independent generators βi.
(c) Two integer matrices A, B that relate the old and new generators as follows:(
β1, . . . , βℓ
)
=
(
α1, . . . αk
)
A,
(
α1, . . . αk
)
=
(
β1, . . . , βℓ
)
B. (43)
This last equation should be read in multiplicative notation (as in e.g. [153]), where
“vectors” of group elements are right-multiplied by matrices as follows: given the ith
column ai of A (for the left hand case), we have βi = (α1, . . . , αk)ai = α
ai(1)
1 · · ·αai(k)k .
Our definition of the group decomposition is more general than the one given in [35, 36]. In
Cheung and Mosca’s formulation, the task is to find just β and c. The algorithm they give
also computes the matrix A in order to find the generators βi (cf. the next section). What
is completely new in our formulation is that we ask in addition for the matrix B.
Note that a group-decomposition table (α, β,A,B, c) contains a lot of information
about the group structure of B. First of all, the tuple elements (a-b) tell us that B is
isomorphic to a decomposed group G = Zc1 × · · · × Zck . In addition, the matrices A and B
provide us with an efficient method to re-write linear combinations of the original generators
αi as linear combinations of the new generators βj (and vice-versa). Indeed, equation (43)
implies
αx11 · · ·αxkk =
(
α1, . . . αk
)
x =
(
β1, . . . , βℓ
)
(Bx), for any x ∈ Zk,
βy11 · · · βyℓ1 =
(
β1, . . . , βℓ
)
y =
(
α1, . . . αk
)
(Ay), for any y ∈ Zℓ.
It follows that, for any given x, the integer string y = Bx (which can be efficiently computed
classically) fulfills the condition αx11 · · ·αxk1 = βy11 · · · βyℓ1 . (A symmetric argument proves the
opposite direction.)
As we discussed earlier in the introduction, the group decomposition problem is provably
hard for classical computers within the black-box setting, and it is at least as hard as Factor-
ing (or Order Finding) for matrix groups of the form Z×N (the latter being polynomial-time
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reducible to group decomposition). It can be also shown that group decomposition is also
at least as hard as computing discrete logarithms, a fact that we will use in the proof of
theorems 6, 7:
Lemma 1 (Multivariate discrete logarithms). Let β1, . . . , βℓ be generators of some
Abelian black-box group B with the property B = 〈β1〉 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 〈βℓ〉. Then, the following
generalized version of the discrete-logarithm problem is polynomial time reducible to group
decomposition: for a given β ∈ B, find an integer string x such that βx11 · · · βxℓℓ = β.
Proof. Define a new set of generators for B by adding the element βℓ+1 = β to the given set
{βi}. The array α′ := (β1, . . . , βℓ +1) defines an instance of Group Decomposition. Assume
that a group decomposition table (α′, (β′1, . . . , β
′
m), A
′, B′, c′) for this instance of the problem
is given to us. We can now use the columns b′i of the matrix B
′ to re-write the previous
generators βi in terms of the new ones:
βi = (β1, . . . , βℓ+1)ei =
(
β′1, . . . , β
′
m
)
(B′ei) =
(
β′1, . . . , β
′
m
)
b′i = β
′b′i(1)
1 · · · β
′b′i(m)
m . (44)
Here, ei denotes the integer vector with e(i) = 1 and e(j) = 0 elsewhere. Conditions (a-b)
imply that the columns b′i can be treated as elements of the group G = Zc′1×· · ·×Zc′m . Using
this identification, the original discrete logarithm problem reduces to finding an integer string
x ∈ G such that b′ℓ+1 = (b′1, . . . , b′ℓ)x =
∑
x(i)b′i (now in additive notation). The existence
of such an x can be easily proven using that the elements β1, . . . , βℓ generate B: the latter
guarantees the existence of an x such that
βℓ+1 = (β1, . . . , βℓ)x =
(
β′1, . . . , β
′
m
)
(b′1, . . . , b
′
ℓ)x =
(
β′1, . . . , β
′
m
)
b′ℓ+1, (45)
which implies (b′1, . . . , b
′
ℓ)x ≡
(
β′1, . . . , β
′
m
)
b′ℓ+1 mod (c
′
1, . . . , c
′
m). By finding such an x, we
can solve the multivariate discrete problem, since βx11 · · · βxℓℓ = β
′b′
ℓ+1
(1)
1 · · · β
′b′
ℓ+1
(m)
m = βℓ+1 =
β, due to (44). Finally, note that we can find x efficiently with existing deterministic classical
algorithms for Group Membership in finite Abelian groups (cf. lemma 3 in [2]).
We highlight that, in order for the latter result to hold, it seems critical to use our formu-
lation of group decomposition instead of Cheung-Mosca’s. Consider again the discrete-log
problem over the group Z×p (recall section 5.1). This group Z×p is cyclic of order p− 1 and a
generating element a is given to us as part of the input of the discrete-log problem. Although
it is not known how to solve this problem efficiently, Cheung-Mosca’s group decomposition
problem (find some linearly independent generators and their orders) can be solved effort-
lessly in this case, by simply returning a and p − 1, since 〈a〉 = Z×p ∼= Zp−1. The crucial
difference is that Cheung-Mosca’s algorithm returns a factorization Zc1 × · · · × Zcℓ of B,
but it cannot be used to convert elements between the two representations efficiently (one
direction is easy; the other requires computing discrete logarithms). In our formulation, the
matrices A, B provide such a method.
Quantum algorithm for group decomposition
We now present a quantum algorithm that solves the group decomposition problem.
Algorithm 6 (Extended Cheung-Mosca’s algorithm).
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Input. A list of generators α = (α1, . . . , αk) of an Abelian black-box group B
23.
Output. A group decomposition table (α, β,A,B, c).
1. Use the order finding algorithm (comprising normalizer circuit over Z × B and clas-
sical postprocessing) to obtain the orders di of the generators αi. Then, compute
(classically) and store their least common multiplier d = lcm(d1, . . . , dk).
2. Define the function f : Zkd → B as f(x) = αx(1)1 · · ·αx(k)k , which is a group homomor-
phism and hides the subgroup ker f (its own kernel). Apply the Abelian HSP algorithm
to compute a set of generators h1, . . . , hm of ker f . This round uses normalizer circuits
over Zkd ×B and classical post-processing (cf. section 5.4).
3. Given the generators hi of ker f one can classically compute a k× ℓ matrix A (for some
ℓ) such that (β1, . . . , βℓ) = (α1, . . . , αk)A is a system of linearly independent generators
[36, theorem 7]. β, A and the orders ci of the βis (computed again via an order-finding
subroutine) will form part of the output.
4. Finally, we show how to classically compute a valid relationship matrix B. (This step
is not part of Cheung-Mosca’s original algorithm.) The problem reduces to finding a
k × ℓ integer matrix X with two properties:
(a) X is a solution to the equation (α1, . . . , αk)X = (α1, . . . , αk). Equivalently, every
column xi of X is equal (modulo d) to some element of the coset ei+ker f ⊂ Zkd.
(b) Every column xi is an element of the image of the matrix A.
It is easy to see that a matrix X fulfilling (a-b) always exists, since for any αi, there
exists some yi such that αi = (β1, . . . , βℓ)yi (because the βis generate the group). It
follows that αi = (α1, . . . , αk)(Ayi). Then, the matrix with columns xi = Ayi has the
desired properties.
Our existence proof for X is constructive, and tells us that X can be computed in
quantum polynomial time by solving a multivariate discrete logarithm problem (lemma
1). However, we will use a more subtle efficient classical approach to obtain X, by
reducing the problem to a system of linear equations over Abelian groups [2, 3].
Let H be a matrix formed column-wise by the generators hi of ker f . By construction,
the image of the map H : Zmd → Zkd fulfills imH = ker f . Properties (a-b) imply that
the ith column xi of X must be a particular solution to the equations xi = Ayi with
yi ∈ Zℓ and xi = ei +Hzi mod d, with zi ∈ Zmd . These equations can be equivalently
written as a system of linear equations over Zm+ℓ:
(
A −H)(yi
zi
)
= ei mod d, (yi, zi) ∈ Zmd × Zℓ, (46)
which can be solved in classical polynomial time using e.g. algorithms from [3]. Then,
the matrix X can be constructed column wise taking xi = Ayi.
23Cheung and Mosca’s original presentation first used Shor’s algorithm to decompose B into Sylow p-
subgroups, and then performed the group decomposition on these subgroups. As they commented, that
step was not strictly necessary, although it would reduce the computational resources required. Also, their
algorithm does not receive a list of generators as an input, but this is not a big difference since such a list
can always be computed in probabilistic classical polynomial-time for a uniquely encoded black-box group.
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Finally, given such an X, it is easy to find a valid B by computing a Hurt-Waid
integral pseudo-inverse A# of A [154, 155]:
α = αX = α(AA#)X = (αA)(A#X) = (β1, . . . , βℓ)(A
#X). (47)
In the third step, we used that A# acts as the inverse of A on inputs x ∈ Zk that
live in the image of A [154]. Since integral pseudo-inverses can be computed efficiently
using the Smith normal form (see e.g. our dicussion in [3, appendix D]), we finally set
B := A#X.
6 Simulation of black-box normalizer circuits
Our results so far show that the computational power of normalizer circuits over black-box
groups (supplemented with classical pre- and post- processing) is strikingly high: they can
solve several problems believed to be classically intractable and render the RSA, Diffie-
Hellman, and elliptic curve public-key cryptosystems vulnerable. In contrast, standard nor-
malizer circuits, which are associated with Abelian groups that are explicitly decomposed,
can be efficiently simulated classically, by exploiting a generalized stabilizer formalism [1–3]
over Abelian groups.
It is natural to wonder at this point where the computational power of black-box normal-
izer circuits originates. In this section, we will argue that the hardness of simulating black-
box normalizer circuits resides precisely in the hardness of decomposing black-box Abelian
groups. An equivalence is suggested by the fact that we can use these circuits to solve the
group decomposition problem and, in turn, when the group is decomposed, the techniques in
[1–3] render these circuits classically simulable. In this sense, then, the quantum speedup of
such circuits appears to be completely encapsulated in the group decomposition algorithm.
This intuition can be made precise and be stated as a theorem.
Theorem 6 (Simulation of black-box normalizer circuits). Black-box normalizer cir-
cuits can be efficiently simulated classically using the stabilizer formalism over Abelian groups
[1–3] if a subroutine for solving the group-decomposition problem is provided as an oracle.
The proof of this theorem is the subject of section B in the appendix.
Since normalizer circuits can solve the group decomposition problem (section 5.5), we
obtain that this problem is complete for the associated normalizer-circuit complexity class,
which we now define.
Definition 2 (Black-Box Normalizer). The complexity class Black-Box Normalizer
is the set of oracle problems that can be solved with bounded error by at most polynomi-
ally many rounds of efficient black-box normalizer circuits (as defined in section 4.3), with
polynomial-sized classical computation interspersed between. In other words, if N is an or-
acle that given an efficient (poly-sized) black-box normalizer circuit as input, samples from
its output distribution, then
Black-Box Normalizer = BPPN . (48)
Corollary 1 (Completeness of group decomposition). Group decomposition is a com-
plete problem for the complexity class Black-Box Normalizer under classical polynomial-
time Turing reductions.
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We stress that theorem 6 tells us even more than the completeness of group decompo-
sition. As we discussed in the introduction, an oracle for group decomposition gives us an
efficient classical algorithm to simulate Shor’s factoring and discrete-log algorithm (and all
the others) step-by-step with a stabilizer-picture approach “à la Gottesman-Knill”.
We also highlight that theorem 6 can be restated as a no-go theorem for finding new
quantum algorithms based on black-box normalizer circuits.
Theorem 7 (No-go theorem for new quantum algorithms). It is not possible to find
“fundamentally new” quantum algorithms within the class of black-box normalizer circuits
studied in this work, in the sense that any new algorithm would be efficiently simulable using
the extended Cheung-Mosca algorithm and classical post-processing.
This theorem tells us that black-box normalizer circuits cannot give exponential speedups
over classical circuits that are not already covered by the extended Cheung-Mosca algorithm;
the theorem may thus have applications to algorithm design.
Note, however, that this no-go theorem says nothing about other possible polynomial
speed-ups for black-box normalizer circuits; there may well be other normalizer circuits that
are polynomially faster, conceptually simpler, or easier to implement than the extended
Cheung-Mosca algorithm. Our theorem neither denies that investigating black-box normal-
izer could be of pedagogical or practical value if, e.g., this led to new interesting complete
problems for the class Black-Box Normalizer.
Finally, we note that theorem 6 can be extended to the general Abelian hidden subgroup
problem to show that the quantum algorithm for the Abelian HSP becomes efficiently clas-
sically simulable if an algorithm for decomposing the oracular group O is given to us (cf.
section 5.4 and refer to appendix C for a proof). We discuss some implications of this fact
in the next sections.
7 Universality of short quantum circuits
Since all problems in Black-Box Normalizer are solvable by the extended Cheung-Mosca
quantum algorithm (supplemented with classical processing), the structure of said quantum
algorithm allows us to state the following:
Theorem 8 (Universality of short normalizer circuits). Any problem in the class
Black-Box Normalizer can be solved by a quantum algorithm composed of polynomially-
many rounds of short normalizer circuits, each with at most a constant number of normal-
izer gates, and additional classical computation. More precisely, in every round, normalizer
circuits containing two quantum Fourier transforms and one automorphism gate (and no
quadratic phase gate) are already sufficient.
Proof. This result follows immediately form the fact that group decomposition is complete
for this class (theorem 1) and from the structure of the extended Cheung-Mosca quantum
algorithm with this problem, which has precisely this structure.
Similarly to theorem 6, theorem 8 can be extended to the general Abelian HSP setting.
For details, we refer the reader to appendix C.
We find the latter result is insightful, in that it actually explains a somewhat intriguing
feature present in Deutsch’s, Simon’s, Shor’s and virtually all known quantum algorithms for
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solving Abelian hidden subgroup problems: they all contain at most two quantum Fourier
transforms! Clearly, it follows from this theorem than no more than two are enough.
Also, theorem 8 tells us that it is actually pretty useless to use logarithmically or poly-
nomially long sequences of quantum Fourier transforms for solving Abelian hidden subgroup
problems, since just two of them suffice24. In this sense, the Abelian HSP quantum algo-
rithm uses an asymptotically optimal number of quantum Fourier transforms. Furthermore,
the normalizer-gate depth of this algorithm is optimal in general.
8 Other Complete problems
We end this paper by giving two other complete problems for the complexity class Black
Box Normalizer.
Theorem 9 (Hidden kernel problem is complete). Let the Abelian hidden kernel prob-
lem (Abelian HKP) be the subcase of the hidden subgroup problem where the oracle function
f is a group homomorphism from a group of the form G = Za×ZN1×· · ·×ZNb into a black-
box group B. This problem is complete for Black Box Normalizer under polynomial-time
Turing reductions.
Proof. Clearly group decomposition reduces to this problem, since the quantum steps of
the extended Cheung-Mosca algorithm algorithm (steps 1 and 3) are solving instances of
the Abelian kernel problem. Therefore, the Abelian HKP problem is hard for Black Box
Normalizer.
Moreover, Abelian HKP can be solved with the general Abelian HSP quantum algorithm,
which manifestly becomes a black-box normalizer circuit for oracle functions f that are group
homomorphisms onto black-box groups. This implies that Abelian HKP is inside Black Box
Normalizer, and therefore, it is complete.
Note. Although we originally stated the Abelian HSP for finite groups, one can first
apply the order-finding algorithm to compute a multiple d of the orders of the elements f(ei),
where ei are the canonical generators of G. This can be used to reduce the original HKP
problem to a simplified HKP over the group Zad × ZN1 × · · · × ZNb
The latter result can be extended to the HSP setting to show that the Abelian hidden
subgroup problem is polynomial-time equivalent to decomposing groups of the form O (cf.
appendix C).
Theorem 10 (System of linear equations over groups). Let α be a group homomor-
phism from a group G = Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNb onto a black-box group B. An instance of a
linear system of equations over G and B 25 is given by α and an element b ∈ B. Our task
is to find a general (x0,K) solution to the equation
α(x) = b, x ∈ G,
where x0 is any particular solution and K is a generating set of the kernel of α. This problem
is complete for Black Box Normalizer under polynomial-time Turing reductions.
24This last comment does not imply that building up sequences of Fourier transforms is useless in general.
On the contrary, this can be actually be useful, e.g., in QMA amplification [156].
25These systems where studied extensively in our previous works [2, 3] in the decomposed-group setting.
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Proof. Clearly, this problem is hard for our complexity class, since the Abelian hidden kernel
problem reduces to finding K.
Moreover, this problem can be solved with black-box normalizer circuits and classical
computation, proving its completeness. First, we find a decomposition B =
⊕〈βi〉 ∼= H =
Zc1 × · · · × Zcℓ with black-box normalizer circuits. Second, we recycle the de-black-boxing
idea from the proof of theorem 6 to compute a matrix representation of α, and solve the
multivariate discrete logarithm problem b = β
b(1)
1 · · · βb(ℓ)ℓ , b ∈ H, either with black-box
normalizer circuits or classically (recall section 5.5). The original system of equations can
now be equivalently written as Ax = b (mod H). A general solution of this system can be
computed with classical algorithms given in [3].
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A Proof of theorem 4
To prove the result we can assume that we know a group isomorphism ϕ : Z×N → G that
decomposes the black-box group as a product of cyclic factors G = ZN1 × · · · × ZNd . Let
Uϕ : HB → HG be the unitary that implements the isomorphism Uϕ|b〉 = |ϕ(b)〉 for any
b ∈ Z×N . It is easy to check that C is a normalizer circuit over ZM × G if and only if
(I ⊗ Uϕ)C(I ⊗ Uϕ)† is a normalizer circuit over ZM × Z×N : automorphism (resp. quadratic
phase) gates get mapped to automorphism (resp. quadratic phase) gates and vice-versa;
isomorphic groups have isomorphic character groups [58], and therefore Fourier transforms
get mapped to Fourier transforms.
As a result, it is enough to prove the result in the basis labeled by elements of Z×M ×G.
The advantage now is that we can use results from [1, 2]. In fact, the rest of the proof will
be similar to the proof of theorem 2 in [1].
We define α := ϕ(a). The action of Ume in the G-basis reads Ume|m, g〉 = |m,mα+ g〉,
in additive notation. Define a fuction F (m, g) = (m,mα + g). We now assume that M
is not divisible by |a| and that there exists a normalizer circuit C such that ‖C − Ume‖ ≤
δ with δ = 1 − 1/√2 and try to arrive to a contradiction. This property implies that
‖C|m, g〉 − Ume|m, g〉‖ ≤ δ for any standard basis state, and consequently
|〈F (m, g)|C|m, g〉| ≥ 1− δ = 1√
2
(49)
It was shown in [1] that C|m, g〉 is a uniform superposition over some subset x+H of G, being
H a subgroup. If H has more than two elements, then C|m, g〉 is a uniform superposition
over more than two computational basis states. It follows that 〈n, h|C|m, g〉 ≤ 1√
2
for any
basis state |n, h〉 in contradiction with 49, so that we can assume H = {0} and that C|m, g〉 is
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a standard basis state. Then (49) implies that |F (m, g)〉 and C|m, g〉 must coincide for every
(m, g) ∈ ZM ×G, so that C must perfectly realize the transformation |(m, g)〉 → |F (m, g)〉;
however, the only classical functions that can be implemented by normalizer circuits of this
form are affine maps [1], meaning that F (m, g) = f(m, g) + b for some group automorphism
f : ZM ×G→ ZM ×G and some b ∈ ZM ×G.
Finally, we arrive to a contradiction showing that F (m, g) is not affine unless M is a
multiple of |a|. First, by evaluating F (m, g) = f(m, g) + b = (m,mα + g) at (0, 0),(1, 0)
and elements of the form (0, g), we can compute b and a matrix representation A of the
automorphism f [1]: we obtain b = 0, so that F (m, g) must be an automorphism, and A =(
1 0
α 1
)
. However, for the matrix A to be a matrix representation of a group automorphism,
the first column a1 needs to fulfill the equation: Ma1 (mod ZM×G) [2, lemma 2]. Expanding
this equation, we finally get that Mα = 0 (mod G), which means that M needs to be a
multiple of the order of α.
B Proof of theorem 6
In this section we will prove theorem 6. The proof uses results of Section 5.5; the reader
may wish to review that section before proceeding with this proof.
We first state the simulation result of [3], summarized below:
Theorem 11 ([3, theorem 1]). Let G = Za×ZN1×· · ·×ZNc×Tb be an explicitly decomposed
elementary abelian group. Suppose we are given a normalizer circuit over G, where each gate
is specified as follows (assume each gate is such that all entries of the matrices and vectors
below are rational):
• A (partial) quantum Fourier transform is specified by the elementary subgroups it acts
on.
• A group automorphism is specified as a matrix A, as in the normal form that we will
introduce in Thm 12.
• A quadratic phase gate is specified as (M,v), where M is a matrix and v is a matrix,
as in the normal form that we will introduce in Thm 13.
Then the output distribution of this normalizer circuit can be sampled classically efficiently.
We will describe precisely what we mean by the normal forms of normalizer gates in the
following sections.
Given a black-box normalizer circuit acting on a black-box group G = Za × Tb × ZN1 ×
· · · × ZNc ×B, there are two things we need to do to de-blackbox it, so that the circuit can
be classically simulated:
1. Decompose the black-box portion of G, B, into cyclic subgroups: B = ZNc+1 × · · · ×
ZNc+d .
2. Calculate normal forms for each of the normalizer gates in the computation.
Assuming we have access to an oracle for Group Decomposition, Task 1 can already be
done. In this proof we will concentrate on tackling task 2, for group automorphisms and
quadratic phase gates (a quantum Fourier transform is easily specified by the subgroup it
acts on).
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B.1 Group automorphisms
Suppose we have an abelian group G = Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc × Tb; we can represent each
element g ∈ G as an a+b+c-tuple of real numbers g = (g1, · · · , gm), where each of the gi’s are
only defined modulo the characteristic char(Gi) of the group Gi, multiplied by some integer.
(We have char(Z) = 0, char(T) = 1, and char(ZN ) = N .) Using this matrix representation,
it turns out that there exist normal forms for the group automorphisms and quadratic phase
functions:
Theorem 12 (Normal form of a matrix representation [3, lemmas 7, 8]). Let G =
G1 × · · · × Gm be an elementary Abelian group. A real n × m matrix A is a valid matrix
representation of some group automorphism α : G→ G iff A is of the form
A :=
AZZ 0 0AFZ AFF 0
ATZ ATF ATT
 (50)
with the following restrictions:
1. AZZ and ATT are arbitrary integer matrices.
2. AFZ, AFF are integer matrices: the first can be arbitrary, while the coefficients of the
second must be of the form
A(i, j) = αi,j
Ni
gcd (Ni, Nj)
(51)
where αi,j can be arbitrary integers, and Ni is the order of the i-th cyclic subgroup of
F , ZNi. The coefficients of the i-th rows of these matrices can be chosen w.l.o.g. to lie
in the range [0, Ni) (by taking remainders).
3. ATZ and ATF are real matrices: the former is arbitrary, while the coefficients of the
latter are of the form A(i, j) = αi,j/Nj , where αi,j can be arbitrary integers, and Ni
is the order of the i-th cyclic subgroup of F , ZNi. (Due to the periodicity of the torus,
the coefficients of ATZ, ATF can be chosen to lie in the range [0, 1).)
Recall the underlying group is G = Za × Tb × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc × B with B ∼= ZNc+1 ×
· · · × ZNc+d . Assume we are given black box access to a group automorphism α : G → G
implemented as a classical function (a uniformly generated circuit family, say). We wish to
find a matrix representation for A for f . We will assume (for the efficiency of this algorithm)
that the size and precision of the coefficients are upper bounded by some known constant D,
i.e. each element of M can be written as Ai,j = αi,j/βi,j for integers αi,j , βi,j with absolute
value no more than D.26
We will show how to find the matrix representation A in two steps:
1. Given access to α, we show how to switch the input and output of α from the black-
box encoding (where the group action is implemented as a black-box circuit) to the
decomposed group encoding (where elements of the group are given as a list of numbers,
and the group action is simply addition of vectors), and vice versa.
26Note that D can be inferred from the precision bound (see section 4.3) of the automorphism gate. If the
automorphism gate increases the input size by at most n bits, then it follows that the size of the denominator
or numerator of every matrix element can increase by at most D = 2n. A similar argument will hold for
quadratic phase gates.
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2. Once we have achieved this, we can implement classically a rational function f :
Qℓ+m+k → Qℓ+m+k that implements α in decomposed form. We will show how to
obtain the matrix representation A from this f .
B.1.1 Switching from black-box encoding to decomposed group encoding.
We need to be able to convert elements back and forth from the black-box encoding and
the decomposed group encoding. We assume our black box group B has already been
decomposed, i.e. we have found linearly independent generators b1, · · · , bk′ of B such that
B = 〈β1〉 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 〈βℓ〉; moreover, we know the order N ′i = Nc+i of βi. Define the explicitly
decomposed group ZB = ZN ′
1
× · · · × ZN ′
d
; then we need to be able to perform the following
tasks:
(a) Our first task is to map an element from the decomposed group ZB to the black
box group B. In otherwords, we need to be able to compute the following group
homomorphism ϕ:
ϕ : ZB → B, ϕ(g) = bg(1)1 · · · bg(d)d , for any g ∈ ZB.
(b) Our second task is to convert elements from the original black-box group encoding to
the new encoding defined by ZB. In other words, given an arbitrary b ∈ B, we need
to be able to compute ϕ−1(b).
Note that it is always possible to compute ϕ(g) = b
g(1)
1 · · · bg(d)d for any g ∈ ZB, since this can
be done using a polynomial number of queries to the black-box group oracle (using repeated
squaring if necessary for the exponentiation). Task (a) is therefore immediate.
As for Task (b), we note that computing ϕ−1(b) for an element b ∈ B is equivalent
to finding a list of integers (g(1), · · · , g(d)) such that bg(1)1 · · · bg(d)d = b. This is a special
case of the multivariate discrete logarithm problem, defined in lemma 1; from lemma 1 we
see that Task (b) can be solved efficiently with a polynomial number of calls to the Group
Decomposition oracle.
B.1.2 Finding the matrix representation A
Now by converting the input and output of α to the decomposed group representation, we
may assume that we instead have a classical rational function f : Qa+b+c+d → Qa+b+c+d
such that f can be treated as a group automorphism on G:
f(x) ≡ f(x′) mod G if x ≡ x′ mod G. (52)
(Here we say two vectors are equal modulo G if each pair of corresponding entries are equal
modulo char(Gi).) We wish to find a matrix representation A for f . For most entries of A
this is trivial: note that we have
Ai,j ≡ f(ej)i mod ci (53)
where ci = char(Gi). Hence by evaluating f on the unit vectors ei, we can determine Ai,j
modulo ci. Thus we can evalute ATF exactly, the coefficients of the i-th rows of AFZ and
AFF modulo ZNi , and the coefficients of ATZ and ATF modulo 1. This is sufficient for the
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cases listed above; the only case we still need to treat is ATT, whose entries are arbitrary
integers (and ci = char(T) = 1 in this case). We can instead evaluate f(ej/α) for some large
integer α:
Ai,j/α ≡ f(ej/α)i mod ci (54)
which allows us to determine Ai,j modulo αci for our choice of α. Choosing α > 2D then
allows us to determine Ai,j exactly for the case of ATT.
B.2 Quadratic phase functions
We will continue to use the matrix representation referenced in the last section.
Theorem 13 (Normal form of a quadratic function[3, lemmas 8, 11, and theorem 3]).
Let G = Za × ZN1 × · · · × ZNc × Tb be an elementary Abelian group. Define Z•N =
{0, 1/N, · · · , (N − 1)/N} to be a group under addition modulo 1, and let G• = Ta × Z•N1 ×
· · · × Z•Nc × Zb. Then a function ξ : G→ U(1) is quadratic if and only if
ξ(g) = epii (g
TMg + CTg + 2vTg) (55)
where C, v, M are, respectively, two vectors and a matrix that satisfy the following:
• v is an element of G•;
• M is the matrix representation of a group homomorphism from G to G•, which neces-
sarily has the form
M :=
MTZ MTF MTTMF •Z MF •F 0
MZZ 0 0
 (56)
with the following restrictions:
– MZZ and MTT are arbitrary integer matrices.
– MF •Z and MTF are rational matrices, the former with the form M(i, j) = αi,j/Ni
and the latter with the form M(i, j) = αi,j/Nj , where αi,j are arbitrary integers,
and Ni is the order of the i-th cyclic subgroup ZNi.
– MF •F is a rational matrix with coefficients of the form
M(i, j) =
αi,j
gcd (Ni, Nj)
(57)
where αi,j are arbitrary integers, and Ni is the order of the i-th cyclic subgroup
ZNi.
– MTZ is an arbitrary real matrix.
The entries of MF •Z, MTF , MF •F , and MTZ can be assumed to lie in the interval
[0, 1). Moreover, M can be assumed to be symmetric, i.e. MTZZ = MTT, M
T
F •Z = MTF ,
MTF •F = MF •F , and M
T
TZ = MTZ.
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• C is an integer vector dependent on M , defined component-wise as C(i) = M(i, i)ci,
where ci is the characteristic of the group Gi. (Recall that char(Z) = 0, char(T) = 1,
and char(ZN ) = N .)
Recall the underlying group is G = Za×Tb×ZN1×· · ·×ZNc×B with B ∼= ZNc+1×· · ·×
ZNc+d. Assume we are given a quadratic phase gate ξ, implemented as a classical circuit
family q : G→ Q such that
ξ(g) = e2piiq(g) ∀g ∈ G. (58)
Since we can switch between the black-box group and decomposed group encodings (see
section B.1.1), we can assume the elements of G are treated as a vector in Qa+b+c+d.
We wish to write the quadratic function ξ(g) in the normal form given by theorem 13,
i.e. find M, c, v as in theorem 13 such that
ξ(g) = epii (g
TMg + CTg + 2vTg). (59)
q, and henceM , c, and v, are rational by assumption. We will furthermore assume, as before,
that the size and precision of the coefficients are upper bounded by some known constant D,
i.e. each element of M can be written as Mi,j = αi,j/βi,j for integers αi,j, βi,j with absolute
value no more than D.
To do this, let us first determine the entries of M . This can be done in the following
manner: it should be straightforward to verify that
ξ(x+ y) = ξ(x)ξ(y)e2pii x
TMy (60)
for any x, y ∈ G, and therefore
xTMy ≡ q(x+ y)− q(x)− q(y) mod Z. (61)
We can use this method to determine nearly all the entries of M exactly, by taking x
and y to be unit vectors ei and ej ; this would determine Mij up to an integer, i.e.
Mi,j = e
T
i Mej ≡ q(ei + ej)− q(ei)− q(ej) mod Z. (62)
This determines all entries of M except for those in MZZ and MTT (the other entries can
be assumed to lie in [0, 1)). To deal with MZZ we take x = α
−1ei, and y = ej , such that the
coefficient M(i, j) is in the submatrix MZZ and 1/α is an element of the circle group with
α < 2D, where D is the precision bound. We obtain an analogous equation(
eTi
α
Mej
)
≡ Mi,j
α
≡ q(α−1ei + ej)− q(α−1ei)− q(ej) mod Z, (63)
which allows us to determine Mi,j : since the number Mi,j/α is smaller than 1/2 in absolute
value, the coefficient is not truncated modulo 1. One can apply the same argument to obtain
the coefficients of MTT, choosing x = ei, and y = α
−1ej .
Once we determine all the entries of M in this manner, we get immediately the vector C
as well (since C(i) = ciM(i, i)). It is then straightforward to calculate the vector v˜. Thus we
can efficiently find the normal form of ξ(g) through polynomially many uses of the classical
function q.
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C Extending theorem 6 to the Abelian HSP setting
In this appendix, we briefly discuss that theorem 6 (and some of the results that follow from
this theorem) can be re-proven in the general hidden subgroup problem oracular setting that
we studied in section 5.4. This fact supports our view (discussed in the main text) that the
oracle models in the HSP and in the black-box setting are very close to each other.
Recall that the main result in this section (theorem 5) states that the quantum algorithm
Abelian HSP is a normalizer circuits over a group of the form Zd1 × · · · × Zdm × O, where
O is a group associated with the Abelian HSP oracle f via the formula (36). The group O
is not a black-box group, because no oracle to multiply in O was provided. However, we
discussed at the end of section 5.4 that one can use the hidden subgroup problem oracle to
perform certain multiplications implicitly.
We show next that theorem 6 can be re-casted in the HSP setting as “the ability to
decompose the oracular group O renders normalizer circuits over Zd1×· · ·×Zdm×O efficiently
classically simulable”. To see this, assume a group decomposition table (α, β,A,B, c) is given.
Then we know O ∼= Zc1 × · · · × Zcm . Let us now view the function α(g) = (g, f(g)) used
in the HSP quantum algorithm as a group automorphism of G× Zc1 × · · · × Zcm , where we
decompose O. Then, it is easy to check that
(
1 0
B 1
)
is a matrix representation of this map.
It follows that the group decomposition table can be used to de-black-box the HSP oracle,
and this fact allows us to adapt the proof of theorem 6 step-by-step to this case.
We point out further that the extended Cheung-Mosca algorithm can be adapted to the
HSP setting, showing that normalizer circuits over G × O can be used to decompose O.
This follows from the fact that the function f that we need to query to decompose B using
the extended Cheung-Mosca algorithm (algorithm 6) has precisely the same form as the
HSP oracle. Using the HSP oracle as a subroutine in algorithm 6 (which we can query by
promise), the algorithm computes a group decomposition tuple for O.
Finally, we can combine these last observations with theorem 9 and conclude that the
problem of decomposing groups of the form O is classically polynomial-time equivalent to
the Abelian hidden subgroup problem. The proof is analogous to that of theorem 9.
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